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CHAPTER I
lb Vmlh&lla
CA September 1# 1939, the dark clcmd which bad
havarad ever Europe for tha pravloua twenty yaara
finally umleaahed It# tragic eontenta* Before the
atorm aubalded al% yeara later* over half of the globe
had been waahed In tha blood of mankind* Imperceptible
to moat^ %ia *tor* began to form Immediately after the
1919 Peace Conference and aa the yeara paaaed it gradw*
ally Inoreaaed In gl%e and threat* finally aaaimlng
the ahape of a wlld^eyed* dark-halred, muatachload
little man #ieae voice pealed like thunder from tha
beer halla of Munich* By 1935* a few realized Ita
ômlnoua portent* many more aaw and ohoae to Ignore It*
thinking It would paaa and become abaorbed In the
atmoaphare of a false peace*

Conaequently* not until

1939 did the world fully realize that a major cataatro'*
phe waa upon It#
If Napoleon waa child of a revolution* Hitler
waa bom of a peace treaty#

When the victorious powers

met at Veraalllea In 1919* they faahloned five funda*
mental Ingredient# into what they called a formula for

ptttOfiî

in reality, it may be argued# they wrote out

ft recipe for war#

Eeaentlally, the terms provided fori

territorial change* eomnenaurate with the idea of aelf*
determination* reparatlona in reatitutlon for beginning
an agree#Ive warf dlearmament and deailitarination|
eeourlty; and the Covenant of the league of Katioma #
In eome meaeure^ all five directly affected defeated
Germany* 3he te%%# of Veraaillea were hard and ex*»
acting but hardly Carthaginian In nature#

They were the

remult of a mucoeaalon of compromleee# While the other
vlctorioua powere, notably Oreat Britain, favored lea#
demanding term#, A^anoe, with her traditional fear of
German might, Inalated upon a proatrate Germany*

Inatead

of an atmoephére of tranquility, the peace conference
created a peychoal# of war, and with It the aaaertlon
of Oerman "war guilt," an aoouaatlon no German waa willing
to accept* Thua, the peace conference convoked to end
future war# produced a

and Hie "Diktat* helped

give rlee to a dictator Wlio In turn completed the vicloua
circle by beginning another war*
Rpom 1919 to 19%, becauae of reparation payment#
and military occupation, Germany suffered constant and
peraonal reminder# of defeat* fot until the conclualon
of the locamo Pact in 1928 by Germany, Great Britain,
Prance, Italy, and Belgium did Germany attain any

degree of equality with other nation## In
addition to other measures, locamo provided for a
joint guarantee of Oermany*# weetern frontier# and
the demilitarized Rblnelaad aone, and a# a reeult
created a more peaceful atmoephere for the next four
year# and prepared Germany*# entry Into the League of
Nation# In 1926*

The Locarno eplrlt wae ehort-llved,

however» for ae the financial erlel# beoame the focal
point of world attention, the year 1929 fo\md Europe
once again torn by anxletlee*
%trougbOBt the po#t#war period# reparation#
conetltuted one of Burope*# #oet eerion# problem##

It

wa* a bitter pill for Germany to ewallow, not only
beea%#e ehe wa# financially bankrupt but al#o beoauae
the payment of refmratloiw implied eole guilt for the
war#

To facilitate the otmAereome reparation pmyment#,

the Dawe# flw went Into effect In 192* but ended in
failure five year# later# C%#equently, becanee of
Oezmany*# reluctance and inability to keep up her
obligation# and owln^ to the decline In European
proeperity, the 3bung Plan urn# in#tltuted to provide
a eaner, more liberal reparation# policy* The Young
Plan really never went into effect» however* for a#
the d#prea#lon deepened, hope wa# largely abandoned
of continulag the present #y#tem of reparation»# In

1931, freeldent RoAver propomeA A one year mormtorlim#
and in 193B Cb»no#13.or Bruenlog annoianoed Gemmny**
Inability te contlmie paywnt#*
1952* diaarmmment

once again one of the

main problem# confxronting European atateemen#

It bad

been %ie of the principal iaeuea evolving from the
%egty of Verealllee^ the idea being that all natlone
would dieana on a baaim of equality* While attractive
in theoiy, it wee dieeppointlng in practice#

France

had remained the atrongeat military power in Europe and
her friande had maintained their armie# at an impreaalve
etrenglh* %!# waa rankling to a Germany now almoat
totally diaaraed, and ao it waa with eome juatifioation
that Obanceller Bruenlng# at the opening of tW #orld
Diaarmament Conference In 19*8, put forward Gergmny*#
claim to rearm on a baal# of equality with other
natioiw# Prance» on the other hand, propoaed an
international military force* Between the two* Great
Britain followed an uncertain, vaeillatlng policy#

By

the end of 1930, a compromlae propoaal had been
advanced but one which each atate Interpreted differ*»
m&tly, ao that by the end of the year the cauee for
dlaarmam«at waa ateadily loaing ground, finally reaching
Ita demiae whan Hitler came to power in 1955#
Ih evaluating Anglo*German relatione between 1919

and 1955, certain baaic facta aeam to b# paramount#
Flrat, it must be remembered that Germany enjoyed,
during thla period, very little of «bat might b#
oalled an Independent foreign polloy#

T*hat amall

amount of independence abe did have waa cloaely tied
to the Treaty of Veraalllea and tbrou^ it to th#
League of Mations so that she #ae generally almost
entirely dependent upon the pollclea of the other Great
Pewera* Oonaequently» Germany lacked any real power
to màke bilateral agreeawnta and Ita foreign policy la,
hereby, difficult to evaluate#

Thla «aa clearly

perceptible in 1931 vhen Qermany# In an attempt to
aolve her financial dilemma, waa prevented from
joinlog Auatrla in a ouatome union largely beoauae of
Pfench objection#*

Ih general, however, Germany warn

much lege boatile to Great Britain#

Rpance #aa a till

her real enemy and the principal barrier to her ever
again becoming a flret»rate ix)wer#

Aa a reault,

Germemy looked to Britain aa her only hope in breaking
the ehacklea of Veraalllea and freeing Imraelf of
diplomatic laolatlon#
The British eeemed to reciprocate thla friendly
spirit#

Britain*a policy during this period, however,

eeaentlally aeemed to be one of allaying French feara
of Germany on the one hand and helping Germany overcome

her feeling of Inferiority and resentment on the other
without taking aides with either one»

Great Britain

failed to appreciate Prance*a traditional fear of
Germany and often appeared to look upon Rpanoe aa more
of a potential enemy than Gerimny* Several time#
during thla period, Britain found hereelf at odda with
her old ally of World War I and did not want to se® a
powerful Prance th# domlxmnt force in European politic#»
Other factora alao oauaed Great Britain to
adopt a friendly attitude towarda Germany* Britain
wanted to aee a atronger, awre proaperoua Germany emerge
from the aahea of World War I hecauee ahe felt that a
atable Germany would commercially benefit both countrlee*
She did not^ aa aome maintain, f#ar an economic rivalry
to any great extent*

In addition# ahe looked favorably

on a atrong Germany aa a bulwark agalnat 1±ie communiât
threat from the eaat#

It 1* eaay to exaggerate the

Importance of thla factor In term* of a proapectlve
Ruaalan Invaalon of Europe; on the other hand Britain
had juatlflable feara that Germany ml^rht undergo an
Internal converalon to oommMnlam#

But probably her

moat Important reaaon for favoring a atrong Germany
lay In Britain*a dealr* to aee eatabllahed In central
Europe a force atrong enough partially to off-aet the
powerful position of Prance, In thla* ahe returned to

her old policy of the b&lano* of power, a policy which
had to be revised #om#wh*t to conform to the aplrlt
of Vereaille# and her eommitmente in the I^agwe of
Ratioma »
In etonmary, theref'^re, it oan be «aid that
Anglo-German relatione from 1919 to 1935, and even up
to 1938, reeted on a fairly friendly baele*

Perhape

mere than anyone else* Britain #ae reeponelble for the
remtoratlon of a etrong German etate* In thle lights
It 1# not difflowlt to imderetand Britain** later
policies of appeaeement#

They were not new, for they

had their origin# in the period from the Treaty of
Verealliee to the rlee of Adolph Kltler,
When Hitler came to power In 1965, he wae not
unaware of Great Britain*# P##t frlendlinee# toward#
Oermeny* Kor had hi# eerller admlMitlon for the Grltleh
changed, m M#ln Kampf. Hitler had revealed an early
admiration for the Brltiah#

*^lth England alone," he

#ald, *oonld one begin the new Geiimanlc Invasion# To
gain her favor no aaerifloe ehould be too great,"
Bl# action# upon accee#ion to power indicated that he
1
Adolph Hitler, Main Kenmf. (*ew York* Reynal
& Sltohcook, 1939), 16B%3ST

»Qm
had not altered theme earlier feeling#*

Da fact. In

1933 the Idea of securing an alliance with Great
Britain oonetituted the nimher one point of hi#
foreign policy program* Hitler #ae not motivated by
feeling# of brotherly love for the Britlah, however»
for hi# policy *a# one of trying to convince Britain
that Ru##ia$ being Germany*# obviou# enemy, was al#o
Britain*# enmay» and that a etrong Germmny would be
Britain'# beat guardian againat a Ruaaian threat fr<w
the eaat*

In other wrd#^ Hitler wa# willing to

reoogniae Britlah aupremacy on th* aea# for a free
hauad in eaatem Europe#
When Hitler fallad in hi# early attempt# to reach
an alliance with Great Britain, he began to look around
for #omeone who could complete thl# important taak#

In

thl# regard, he became intereated in a rl#lng young
diplomat named Joachim von Rlbbentrop*

Prom the time

of hi# firat meeting with Hitler in 1938, Hibbentrop
began to play an ever increaaing role in the fuehrer*#
foreign policy, and between 1934*1939 hi# Influence
with Hitler increaeed #o rapidly that eventually he
wa# to become Hitler*# "second Biemarck#" Although at
the outeet both Hitler and Ribbentrop were pM-Britlah,
both believing that an alliance with Great Britain
could be obtained, it was Ribbontrop, much before Hitler,

who realised that thlg eould never be#
But despite the favorable relatione existing
between Great Britain #nd Oermany between 1919 and
1933 and despite Hitler*» pro^^Brltleh sentimentay the
two countrlea In 1959 fotmd themaelvee once again at
war# Whyf

Did Rltler believe that beosnee Britain

had favored a etronger GemwLny after Verealllea that
ahe would not oppoee him If he attacked PolandT

Or wae

It beoaixee he believed that on the baele of Britain*#
record of appeaeement and pacification she wag too
weak and cowardly to fight a rearmed OermanyT

If eo,

what led him to theee convlctloae? fheee ai*e the
l%%)ortant qiieetlone of thle paper, and a considerable
portion of bhe anawer eeeme to lie in Joachim von
Rlbbentrop and hi# role In Eltier*# foreign policy
during the eventful yeara, 1954*1939#

CEAPTBR II
BERLim
The life of Jomcblm vom Ribbeatrop began emld
rather modeet clrotmataaoee # Aayone observing young
Joaohlm during hie youth would imve #een nothing to
fortell hie future notoriety and fWee and It le doubt*»
ful If Rlbbentrop even gllmpeed the path that wae to
oairy him, at Bltler*e aide# to world promlnenoe*
But in deeorlblng Rlbbentrop*# early life, one
le unfortunately confronted with obeoure and con-#
flicting reporte#

of the detail# have been

fumlehed by Blbbentrop hlmwelf or by hie frlende and
aoqualntanoee and to what extent they have been oolored
le difficult to eay. It ie* coneequently^ eafe to
aeaume that the "offlolal"* aooount of Rlbbentrop*#
early life 1# not entirely reliable#
%e youngeet of three brother# and one el#tor,
Joaohlm Rlbbentrop wa# bom on April 50# 189% In
1
Weeel*am"Rheln# Joachim'# father, Richard Rlbbentrop,

Paul Seabury# The WUhelwtraece (Lo# Angelee#
Unlverelty of California"Px^sa, 1ÔS4Î, 46.
-10-

& ôaptaln In tb# R&iser*#

the fifth

generation of hie femlly to eerve e# officer in
German enA Heneverlmn mrmiee#

In treoing Rlbhentrop'e

direct enoeetry, it appear* that the only one to attain
even a elight degree of fame *ae general Rpiedrieh
g
Wilhelm Jobann Ribbentrop who eerved beelde Blueher
at Waterloo and #a# reported to have been a cloee
friend of Oeneral IKOrok»
Three year# after Joaohim*# birth* the family
moved to *^te (a Qermaa city eince 1871)* and there
the mother died of tnberouloale in 1900, %ting Rlbben*
trop reoeived hi# early education in the ^ieerliehe#
ty%enm in Mete* #hile in Net#, hi# father encouraged
hi# #on to oontinue hi# etudie# at a reputable mill*
tary eohool to prepare him for an army career# Joachim,
however, owing in part to a frail eondition inherited

^l%oher, Gebhard I,ebrecht von$ 1748-1819,
frueeian Field Marehal, aided Wellington in Napoleon*#
defeat at Waterloo; nicknamed *Mar#hall fbreard#*
5
Ibrok, von leartenburg, Han# David lAidwig,
1759*1%0, German count, German Field %ar#hal, Oovemor»
General of Baet and ?e#t Pru##ia, commanded eegment
of Id&e Army of liberation againet Wapoleon*

•12-

from his mother* showed little enthumlaem for the
rigors of German militarism and chose to disappoint
hla father by expreeaing an Intereat in 1### exacting
field##
%e detaile of Rlbbentrop*# early childhood are
extremely eketohy*

Even so, it ia evident that he was

much spoiled, first by hie mother and later by hi#
aunt, Gertrude von Rlbbentrop, who, following hi#
mother*a death, lived for long period# in the Rlbbentrop
hoaaehold# 51# eerly achool year# compriae a record
of ml#ehlef, frequent bruahe# with trouble^ and le##
than mediocre #oholaatlo mehlevmmenta, except for a
mazted aptitude f)»r l#nguagea# PuMWlAg thla lingiilatlo
talent, and aupported by hi# aunt, Rlbbentrop apent
the next eeveral year# atudylng in Rrenoh, 8wl### and
&igll»h achool#* In later yeaz#, eonfllotlng report#
were circulated regarding the reault# of theae varioua
aoad*mlc puraulta, hla friend# maintaining that he wa#
*an excellent atudent* ^lle hla enemle# eouatered
4
that he had been#
a mediocre atudent; expelled from thr#e achoola
for Infrectiona of diaclpllnef and that he dla#lpated a fortime inherited from an uncle In
drinking and other debaucheriea while In London
and Pari#,
Regardle## of ^e truth of theae reporta, the

*"#ho la Rlbbentrop," ULvinp: Age. CCCI,(Mar-Aug,
1956), 328.

faet remmlna that h# neither flx&lehed blm course at
Londoa Unlverelty nor eubjected hlmmelf te exeml*
xmtloA at #ie completion of eny of hie llnguletlc etwdlee#
Miy Rlbbentrop oheee not to eblde by mormel ec#demlo
procediaree rwrnlnm eomeWiet of m myetery, end he wee
elwrnya reluctant to dlecuae thla phaee of hie life la
later yeare#

But deeplte the fact that he never

formally completed hie London etttdlee, he managed to
acquire considerable fluency In both french and Xnglleh#
In addition to the ao^uleltlon of theme language akllle,
ehlch he pat to geed nee In later yeare* Rlbbentrop
aleo mtde many Aagllmh friend#»

It 1$ thl# latter

factor that appear* to be the foundation for Rlbbentrop*#
Anglephlllem and eblch prompted him In later year# to
refer to England a# hie "aeeond home#*
At the age of el^^teen# Rlbbentrop left lAndon
for Canada* During hie four year# there* he «a#
employed varlouely am a laborer, bank clerk, time*
keeper, and email mcale Importer of wlnem and liquor##
Although hie #lne buelnemm wee of little euocemm, he
did enjoy mome degree of moclal recognition#

The

Govemor*General of Canada at thlm time was the Duke
of Connaught, (mon of ()ueen Victoria, youngemt brother
of King Edward VII, and uncle of Maimer Vllhelm II)
in «hose household German warn the predominant language#

•14»
Sine# Rlbb#ntrop could ape&k fluent Germmn, French#
end Ingîish and posaesaed a certain social charm, it
waa apparently not too difficult for him to aeoure
Invitation# to aome of the featlvltle# held at Rideau
Ha.ll* Here, hla llngulatlc akllla^ hla talent for pley*
Ing the violin# hla adeptneaa at tennla and bridge# a
flair for dramatic## and the aoon*to*be famou»
Rlbbentrop charm# enabled him to become aomething of
% favorite In Ottawa*# better aoclal met*

It wa#

alwaya a «yatery to hi# Ottawa friend# aho later mat
him while he waa axAeeaedor to lAndon how the Rlbben*
trop charm had evolved Into an exaggerated and over»
bearing arrogance#

Revertheleea# the many friend#

and acquaintance# Rlbbentrop acquired In Canada aerved
further to enhance hi# fondneaa fbr Britain and the
Brltlah people#
Rlbbentrop left (^uaa4a at the outbreak of World
War I and thu# avoided detention a# an enemy alien,
The year 1914 conaequently founds him tmck in Germany#
he enllated in the Euaaar Regiment Number 12# waa aoon
promoted to lieutenant# and aaw action in Poland and
Ru##la where he dlatlngulahed hlmaelf by wiimlng two
Iron Croeaea, PIret and Second Class»

^Pmul Schware#
Julian Meaaner# Imc##

In 1918# he

Man Rlbbentrop (lew Torki

«•15*
##9

to Conatantlnople, but mlnoe tb$

particular mission, to idilch he wms attached ended
In failure he retup%ed to Berlin later that #ame
year*

Rlbbentrop later claimed In hi# awtoblographloal

aketeh In the German #bo*a %bo that after hie return
to Berlin he *ae aaelgned to the one-kmndred^-and^elghty
member German delegation te the Veraallle# Peace
6
Conference* But the offlolml and im*offlclal
publloatlone relating to Wilm delegation have yet
to reveal hla name#
Rlbbentrop waa no exception to the thowaand# of
oWier demoblllxed Oenman officer* #io after the war
looked hopeleaaly about for an occupation partially
commensurate #lth their former etatua# T#o of the
moat cAmmon aolutlona to thle dllitimrnn were to become
merobaat# or to marry wealth#

Rlbbentrop waa more

fortunate than moat Ih that he auoceeded In doing bo%i#
Immediately after the w»r, Rlbbentrop once more
entered %ie wine bualneas and begen a auccemaful
career by bribing the aer^ant In charge of the liquor
auppllea for Berlin*» officer meaaea to chennel a few
cases his way#

In this manner* he waa able to aell

hla mercbandlae at a profit and replenlah hla atock#
Aa Rlbbentrop*a commercial fortune# Increaaed,
6
Seabury* op, clt,. 47#

.16.
Ms social ambitions grew proportionately#

In 1920,

he married Annelle# Henckell# the daughter of Otto
Henekell the millionaire champagne manufacturer#
Although the eider Henckell #a# Inaufflelently impreeeed
#ith hi# ne# aon-ln^law to take him into hie firm aa a
partner, he nevertheleee contributed #ubetantlally to
Joachim** #pirailing mucceae by manipulating aeveral
bugineaa deala in the latter*# favor# Some of theae
manipulation# created a virtual ownopoly In #ome brand#
for Ribbentrop^# company#
Berlin*# inflationary poet^ar day# were marked
by looee morale, the breaking down of old barrier#, and
the riae of the nouveau* rich^#

A# one of thie latter

group» Bibbentrop attained ooneiderable prominence# He
made an effort to be #een at all the boi#terou# function##
including the much publicized **tea dance#^ which con»
tinued to all hour# of the night#

Oceaeionally h# waa

oe#n with hi# wife» but more frequently alone*

Ribben-

trop was an excellent and *ithu#la#tio dancer, two
qualitiea that, when combined with hi# charming manner*
made him popular at theae variou# function##
]h 1926, Ribbentrop*# modal #tatu# received a
boo#t wh#n he waa legally adopted by hia Aunt aertrude
and thn# #ntitled to affix the coveted "von" befbre

7
his name*
Most of the old German nobility sneered
&t tblB change$ aepeclelly elnce there #es aome
qneetlon ## to it# legality, Bwt wndaimted, Rlbben»
trap widely publicized hla new fortune end loat no
time in renaming hie buaineaa *The Von Rlbbentrop
Company,*
Still, despite the fact that he wea now a
we&ltby merchant, the aon»ln*law of a mllllonelre,
and & member of a titled family, Rlbbentrop*# appetite
for aoolal prominence remained imaatlafied* He longed
to break Into diploowtlc aoclety, and to thla end he
exploited every %eana at hla dlapoaal* Be made an
effort to be aeen at aa miny diplomatic ftmctlona aa
poaalble and entertained minor dlplometlc officials at
hla lavlah Dahlem VlllA, preaenting them with generoiia
gift# of wlnea end liquor#, %eae effort# veaulted In
hla becoming better kzAwn, but It waa not until be
attached hlmaelf to Bltler** band wmgùn that they began
to bear fruit#
When the %ial Party flrat began to take root#
during the 1920*#, Ribbentrop waa neither a Razl nor a
laal eympathizer# But he waa a fanmtical anti*bol#beTl#t

^Department of State» United State# Office of
Chief of Counael fbr Proaecution of Axle GrladLnality,
^#1 Qonaplraoy & AKgre##lon. I-VIII, 2 aupplement#.
IWa&ingloa$'"fi7
Oovermaent Printing Office, 1946),
VII, 114, Hereafter known as Haiti Conapirecy &

..18^
and a clever opportunist who never failed to take
advantage of any favorable opportunity to exprea#
puir>llcly hie hatred of bolahevlam#

There la aome

queatlon aa to when Rlbbentrop formally joined th#
ifaal party*

Oae veralon clalma that Itwaa In 1030

under an aaaumed name, but a more official aouroe date#
hla party memberahlp from 193B* However thla may b#»
It la certain that Rlbbentrop waa active In Rati party
olrclea on the eve of Hitler*a aoceaalon to power*
The flrat meeting between Hitler and Rlbbentrop
waa brought about through the effort# of Vlcoo Karl von
Bu#low*pcbm&nte* a black aheap of a famoua family*

One

day In 1932, Hitler waa lamenting th# faot that be had
no on# around him #io could intelligently read th#
London Tlm#a and

Temip# #

Vicoo Immediately int#r#ated

Hltl#r in von Ribb#ntrop whom he d#acrlbed aa a proaperoum
young win# merchant fluent in both French and Bngllah
and who had many Influential Aagllah contacta# Hitler
waa Intereated and the two men finally met at Hitler*#
Bergbof in Berehteagaden on Auguat IB* 1938# Hitler
waa not only Impreased with the young win# merchant*#
potential political value to the party but with hla
aooiablllty a# wall#

Ih the enaulng montha. Hitler

waa a frequent dinner gueat at the Ribbontrop home;
and he came to be equally fond of Rlbbentrop*# wife a«

*19
they ab&red the same taates In cuisine and art*
Ribbentrop assieted In Hltler*a acceealon to
power by acting as a go#betwe#n In arranging th#
8
m##tln betw##5 Hltl#r and von Pap#& at Rlbbentrop*#
home In January 1053*

It was at this meeting that

th# InfamoD# bargain was struck making Hitler ohano#!lor*

Rlbbentrop lat#r exaggerated the Importance of

hla iK)le In Hitler*# aooeaalon to power by stating
that It was tbrou^ his mediation the Hitler government
was formed*
#h#in Hitler came to power In 1953* he named
9
Alfred Ros#nb#rg a# chief of th# Kazl Party*# for#lgn
8
Papen, PTaa* von
G#rm#n diplomat
wa#
Military Attach# In Washington and Mexico City, 1913*
1916* and warn expelled from D#8* for fomenting sabotage;
Reich Chancelier (succ##ding Brw#nlitg}# June Î932*
August 1934; R#ioh Commissar fbr Prussia, 1953;
8p#cial Pl#nipotemtiary for the Saar# 19M"1954;
negotiator of Concordat with th# Vatican, July 1933;
Oeiman ambassador to Austria* 1954*193$; appoint#d
Pl#nlpot#ntiary Minister Extraordinary on special
mission to Austria by Bltler* 1956; awarded Golden Party
Badge of Honor by Hitler after Anschluss; Ambassador to
Turkey, 1959-1944$
'
o
Rosenberg, Alfred * First editor of Ma«i news*
paper, Voelkischer Boebachter. 1921; participated in
1923 MuaTeS'"'apjpoiàîkeS Hitler's privât# envoy
in londoD, 1935; Reichl#it#r and head of Masi Ptrty
Office for Per#ign Policy and Idaology, 1955; R#lch
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941;
member of the Reichstag; publisher of party periodical,
Nomatshefte; official Natl philosopher; author of Myth
oT"'IEii'''''iètïï Century aid other Involved treatises on
TKmsSTKooTrIne #
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program and empowered Rlbbentrop to assist blm*

In

time, tbl* llaaon led to the fommtlon of » special
biireau later to be known as the Buero Rlbbentrop#
It had RO official government sanction other than a#
tiie party*a watchdog on the Wllhelm atraaae#

Soon#

Rlbbentrop and Roaember^ were competing with each
other for Eltler'e favor * both with an eye on the
foreign mlnleter** poeltlon In the foreign oiflce#
Rlbbentrop warn not above severely criticising Rosenberg
In an at kempt to dlecredlt him with the Riehrer*
!Ihe competition between the two men took a
favorable t%m for Rlbbentrop 9±ien Rosenberg was sent
to London In May 1953 on an Important diplomatic mission*
Both before coming to power and after* Hitler bad
placed great emphasis on the Importance of an AngloOerman Alliance#

It was* therefore* Rosenberg's task

In 1955 to sound o^t the British as to how tills al»
llance could best be reached. The form It was to take
Is uncertain, but in 1955 Hitler apparently saw In a
British alliance his only chance of breaking the
shakles of the Versailles "Diktat*"
The Rosenberg Mission, however, proved to he a
significant disappointment*

On Rosenberg*s arrival

in London on May 8, 195$, he was cooly received by
officials of the British foreign o flee* and on May 9

-21.
10
A*reign Secretary Slmoa
reluctantly conmented to
an Interview with this pseudo diplomat#

On May 10,

Roaenberg made the prepoateroua error of placing a
Bwaatlka wreath at the Cenotaph, Britain*# monument
to her %)rld War I dead, and on the next day membere
of the Brltleh legion snatched a*ay the *rea%i *
calling Rosenbergfa lack of judgement

%ct of

desecration,** Rosenberg left London the following day,
forty*el(^t hours earlier than sohoduled and without
seeln^^r the prime minister, the principal object of hie
visit. The London Time* commented the day after
Rosenberg's departuM that *hla visit will hardly be
regarded as a success even by those responsible for
11
it»**
Rosenberg returned to Berlin disgraced In the
eyes of his Pùehrer and leading

Nazi Party officials.

10
Simon, Sir John Allsebrook(PlMt Viscount of
Stackpole Bllldor, 1940) * British Conservative Party
mwsber who was Solicitor General, 1910-1919* Attorney
General, with seat In Cabinet, 191&*1916; Secretary
of State for Horn# Affairs, 1915-1916; Secretary of
State for Pareign Affairs, 1951*1935; Secretary of
State for Rome Affairs and Deputy leader of the House
of Commons, 1955-1937% Chancellor of the Exchequer,
1937^1940; Lord Chancellor, 1940^1945.
11
Seabury, og# olt"# %*37#

Is uafortuaat® misalorn

oeat him much* e«p®ôial-

y his ambition someday to booom# the Reich»» foreign
Inleter# And thw With Roeeaherg'# dlplometlo ater In
he decline, Rlbbentrop** begen It# eeoent# Hitler* more
ad more Impreeeed with Rlbbentrop, meaigned him a nee
aak. He «as to uae his Buere to oolleot and compile
nfomatlon and acandal on every individual in Germany #md
broad who #ma of any public conaequenee# Since thle
atalled eorkinc even mere cloaely with offlolala of the
orelgn office* it waa thua aa collector ef acaMal and
umer that Rlbbentrop flrat eucceeded in getting hla foot
ffectlvely in the front door of the Wllhelmetrasae#
The two organlaatlona, the Wllhelm#traaae and the
uero Rlbbentrop. ae Hitler ordered, were to complement
ach other In all mnttera of foreign affalM# a auppoaitlm»
hat exlated only In theory and rarely in fact# Aa a
eault# a bitter anlmoalty developed between Rlbbentrop
ad the career diplomate, who looked upon Ribbentrep ae
n Interloper In dlplemacy and aa an Irreaponalble aoolal
limber without diplomatic quallflcatlona#

They fnlly

xpected him to go the aame route aa Roaenberg, but In thla
hey were mlataken#

They groaaly underatlmated their man

or "the poacher waa soon to become the gamekeeper.*

•2SSoon after th® Reel* assumed power In 1995,
they deadlocked the world Dlaermement Conference by
Inaleting ttmt Oermeny be allowed to rearm on a baelm
of eqimllty with other nation*#

Coa^romlaee were

propoeed by both the Britimh and Aerman delegation*
but no reeulte were achieved#

Finally, in October

1933# Hitler withdrew eimultaneonely from the World
12
Diearmament Conference and the League of Mfationa*
Hie decieion ehooked everyone, including high ranking
official# of the foreign office# Even mere eiirprieing
wae the fact that Hitler, although he withdrew from
the I/eague and Diaarmament Conference, left the door
open to further negotiation* by allowing it to be
rxmored throughout the ^ropean capital# that be etill
de#i%^ a #olution to the diearmament queation* Ih
oWier word*. Hitler made it plain that he would not
retuMi to Geneva and that he favored bilateral agree**
mxent* with Pranoe and Britain rather than a multi*
lateral I^wigne diearmament pact* In thi* way, h*
hoped to drive a wedge between the we*tern Burcpean
countriee*
To assist him in the execution of thi* new
policy^ Hitler in April 1934 appointed Joachim von
^D®em®nts Or patemational Affaire. 1933, ed*
John W» wSiîiF»^msttTSSÏSST'*SfoîraWr¥©r«ity
Pre**, 1934), 206 &
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Rlbb#ntrop me Special Commimeioner for Dlmermement
Problems&

The appointment was approved by the
15
aging Preeident von Elndenbei% only after Hitler
h&d peramtded him that Rlbbentrop #ae the man for
the jobf aRparently on the grounde that one of
Rlbbentrop*# anoeatorm had fouj^t with Blwcher at
lAmterloo#

Eindenberg'a reaervationa were more than

aeoonded by the top officlala of the 1fi1Jhe]matraaae
#ho proteated that a poat of euoh reaponalbllity
aho%ld only have been given to an experienced member
of the foreign aervloe#

Added to the Buero Rlbbentrop#

the Inaiilt of the new appointment begaw the feud between
Rlbbentrop and the eareer diplomat# vhioh #aa to laat
until the end of the mar*
8oon after hie appointment, Rlbbentrop aet off
on a round of tripe to the weatem European capital#
where he aooompliahed little exoept invariably to
incur the wrath of the reaident German diplomat#*
Rince in hi# apecial diplomatic a tatue he waa reaponel**
ble to no one aave Hitler# Ribbentrop arrived in theae

IT

Hlndenberg# Field Narabal Aiul * World %ir I
German military leader who dethroned the Kaiaer* hero
of Tannenberg; freaident of Germany, 19S@*1954; died
on Augu#t 2, 1954 leaving a political teatament
indicating in ](*aaagee auppreaaed by the Rami# when
the do Ciment waa publlahed# a wiah not to have Hitler
aucoeed him aa Preaident#
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q&pltml# without Ixiformlng th* raeldomt @er*«in
mmb&msmdor mnd then only to wmnd#r off without
proper credeatlml* to oon«ult etmte offlol&lm on
foreign policy, The Oermen foreign office» fruetreted
In Ita ettempt to find out the nature of Rlbbentrop*#
eotlvltlee. finally assigned a junior diplomat a# hi#
14
a##l#tant to report directly to the foreign office*
Rlbbentrop*# flret trip# were dleappolntlng#
Shortly after hi# appointment, he flew to London to
15
confer with Antony Edem and 31r Jbhn Simon In the
hope of dlecoverlng Britain*# attitude toward the
reopening of dlearamment dl#cu##lon## Prime Mini#ter
Stanley Baldwin
14
8oh#ar«,

evaluated th# reeulta of Rlbbentrop*#

olt*. 104#

is
&den, Rt* Hon* (Robert) Anthony*Brltleh
OoneervatlT# Party leader who im# Parllamen^ry Uhder
Secretary In th# foreign Office,
Mini#ter
without Perfollo for lAague of Rmtlon# Affair#* 19&6$
Secretary of State for R)reign Affair# In Baldwin
and Chamberlain cabinet#^ 1935»1958 (#uooeeded by
Halifax)# Secretary of State for Dominion Affair#,
1939«*1940* secretary of mtate for Parelgn Affair# In
Churchill cabinet, 1940*1946; al#o from 1960*1955;
Prim# Mlnlet#r, 195$»T
16
Baldwin 3tanley-Brltl#h Conaervatlve Party
leader who wa# Privy Counoellor, 1980; Chancellor of
Exchequer* 19Sg*192$; Prim# Nlni#t#r and Rrat lord
of the Trea#ury, 1923*1984; al#o from 1904'»89
(#ucceeded by MacDonald), and 1956*193? (#uoo$edlng
MaoDonald and eucceeded by Chamberlain)#

viaIt for the Houa# of Common# by renmrkln*: that *the
oonvereatlonB had added nothing concerning the dla*
armament Iseue to the materiel already lasued^** and
at the game time the Brltlmh foreign office released
a atatement that ^the German representative warn not
encouraged to expect eupport from Britain for Ge%«any*m
17
armament pollclea.*
Di Parle, Rlhbentrop met with
am little aucceee and waa told to take hie propoaala
to Geneva# After experlenclncr aetbacka In other
attempt# to eell Hitler*» policy to weatem Europe*
Rlbbentrop faded temporarily from the guropean dlpio*»
matic gcene#
Tbue, Rlbbentrop In the apace of a fev ahort
year# bad rleen from meager commercial beginning* to
a place of diplomatic prominence# Even more aurprlalng
la the fact that #lthln t«o year# after hie flret
meeting with Hitler, Rlbbentrop had begwa to occupy
a elgnlflcant position In the %azl hierarchy#

Hie

achlevea#nte up to thla point were nothing to be
heralded, but the Important factor le that he had
eufflclently Impreeaed the Fuehrer, an Imqpreaalon
which laid the groundwork for more Important tasks to
come#

In the couree of the next few yeare, Hitler*#

confidence In Rlbbentrop*# abllltle# was to Increaee

17

Schwart, op# clt*. 105#
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tA * point where the former wine merchant etood a#
the man closeet to Hltler*e ear*
Rlbbentrop re-entered the diplomatic epotllght
In MaMh^ 1935# SlMice January, 1935# negotiation* had
been carried on between Germany and Britain to bring
the leader# of both countrlee together around the
conference table#

It bad been decltied earlier that

Sir John Rlmon would vlelt Berlin* but due to Hitler*#
Irritation at the publication of a Qrltleh White Paper
the vlelt had been cancelled* "Qae eltwatlon warn
further aggravated when Hitler, on March 18, 1955,
announced the Introduction of unlvereal military
training# (3kreat Britain, thereupon, and over the
proteet# of France who wanted the matter referred to
the league, decided to reopen negotlatlona on the
propoaed Simon vleit*

Agreement wae finally reached

and the day of the vlelt eet for March l&S, 1936* A#
orlgrlnally scheduled, the %»rtlolpant# were to hav#
18
been Hitler, Eden, Simon, and Weurath, but the
%eurath, Conatantln H#
Baron von German
diplomat who wa# A%d)e#@ador to Denmark, 1919, Italy,
1921*1930, and England, 1930-1932* On 2 June 1952, he
wa# appointed Minister for Jperelgn Affaire and continued
In office by Hitler; auoceeded by Rlbbentrop In
February 1938 and appointed Preeldent of Secret Cabinet
Council; flrat Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia,
1939; temporary retirement, 7 September 1941 (eucceeded
by Heydrlch); final retirement, 19441 member of the
Reichstag! member of the Reich Defease Council; Reich
Minister without Portfolio#

*pp@*renoe of von Rlbbentrop murprlaed the Britlah
and gave an awkward balance to the meeting#

The

British objected but Rlbbentrop reeolved the eltuetlon
by euggeatlng to everyone*a amemementf that Sir Erie
Pbipp#, Brltlab #mb&ea&dor in Berlin end » bitter
enemy of Rlbbentrop, be Invited to the oonferenoe#
This eeemed to satisfy everyone, end the conference
proceeded mrltbOQt further incident*
lA generel^ the dlacneelona produced no definite
settlement# Bltler refuaed to %mrtlolpete In en
eeatem mutuel eaelatenoe pect* He fevored* on the
other bend* blleter&l non**ggreealon pacta with power#
inter##ted In eaetem European oountrlea* and with
respect to dlearmament^ Bltler was particularly un*
oompromlelng* He declared that Oerminy needed not only
thirty*#l% divlelona (awuntlng to a ïmlf^^mllllon men)
but also all type# of armaments poeeeeaed by other
oountrlee» He eould not atop oon#tructlon of these
arms, he deolared, so long as other powers used them*
Hitler also told Simon that Germany would ne#d
a naval fore# totalling

of British tonnag# and

would expect air parity with Great Britain and P^nc#.

Phlppa, Sir Eric * British jlmbasaador to
Germany, 19@%*1957 (succeeded by Henderson);
Ambassador to Prance, 1957*39$
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At the ooncliABlon of the dlacuamlons* h* mmde It
perfectly ole»r to the British foreign eeoret&ry

that Qerowny would not return to the 3LemgMe except
on * baala of complete eqiAellty* By thla. Hitler
laqilled that he meant equality In oolonlee a# well
20
a@ armamente,

Rlbbentrop played a a lient role In the course
of the dlectisalone, Aa on moat occaelon*^ Eltler warn
the dominant figure#

It «net be remeaibered, however^

that At thle point Rlbbentrop wa« jxiet beginning to
make hie bid for Hitler*» favor^ and It le poealble
that Hitler Inalated upon Rlbbent%%p'a preeence a#
part of hla training for the poet of foreign mlnleter#

By Mky, 1935, relatione between Great Britain
and Germany had eteadlly Improved*

On May 2, the
21
British prime minister, Ramaay IWieDonald, expreeeed

In a apeeoh the hope that Britain and Germany would
20

Mildred
Werthelmer^ "Aim# of Hitler*a
Pbrelgn Policy," m>relAn Policy Report#. XI
(June 1935)# 71#
21
KaoDonald, (Jamea) Ramsay » leader of the
Brltleh labor Party who waa Prime Vlnlater of Great
Britain* Jennary-Wovember 1924 and from 1929 to 1935
(aucceedlng and aucceeded by Baldwin both tlmea);
author of the Geneva Protocol, 1924; lArd Prealdent
of the Council, 1955*1957*
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BQotk arrive at some klmd of as agreement ia relation
28
to the limit#tion of naval ermamemt##
Hitler #»#
emoouraged# Rie idea of an Anglo*Oerman naval aEreemm&t
had been kept alive in Germany ainee the Simon vieit*
Hitler declared in a epeeeh before the Reiehatag ia
Maj that he hoped to build a fleet equal te 35^ of total
Britieh tonnage* Although Hitler #na optimietio about
an agreement along theae linea, hie diplomat# in the
foreign office were not* ,Neurath warn extremely
89
peeaimietio# Von Hoeaoh, the aerman amhaaeador to
London, #a# nlao doubtful»

Both advieed Hitler that

Britain would never coneent unleea the broader ieeu#
of eeeurity was aleo dieouaeed*

At thie. Hitler flew

into a rage and ehouted, "if the [geurath and von
Hoeae^ do not believe in the feaaibility of auoh an
94
agreem«at, I know one who doe# * Ribbentrop#*

82

Dooumtent# On D&termational Affaira. 1955#
I# ed# Jbim ## #%e#ier-B#am#%t (^ndon# tWord
imiveralty Proa#, 193#), 141*
89
Hoeaoh# Leopold von Attache in Bekln, 1909;
Barie, 1910# Secretary i# Madrid# 1911; Secretary in
London, 1911.1914# Military aervio#, 1914.1918#
Secretary in Sofia# 1915; ia Oonatamtinople, 1916#
Secretary to P*reign Office in Berlin, 1917# Oouneellor
of Legation in Xorway, 1918; Charge d*affairee in
Madrid, 1919# Ooumaellor in Parie, 1981-1988; Charge
d'affaires in B&ria, 1983# Ambaesador in farie, 19241D38; Ambaaaador to Court of St* Jamea, 1932"^1636.
Died 1936,
24
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Bltler^a mnnouncem#at naming von Rlbbentrop
ma the head of the delegation to tondon for the
naval talk» graatly aurprlaod tb# diplomat# of the
foreign offlo#* In fact, they were ehockeA* Rlbben*"
tropy however# aelzed the opportunity to better hi#
diplomatic etatue* He told Hitler that be would be
hampered In hie negotiation# unless he enjoyed the
eame diplomatic rank a» tho@e with whom be would be
dealing#

Hitler agreed and c^maleeloned him a#

"Ambaeaador^at»large," a rank here*tO"*fore unheard
of In the hierarchy of Germany*# diplomatic officialdom*
The German delegation arrived In London on
June 5, 195G amidet a feetlve throng celebrating the
Rfenty4»Rlftai Jubilee of King George V and Queen Nary.
Rlbbentrop joined In the gaiety by ordering the
management of the Carlton Hotel to Imng a huge
ewaetika flag over the hotel*# Raymarket entrance. He
alao ordered hla official caw decorated with almllar
pennant#. That evening the entire Gerwn deleg^atlon,
lmpre##lve in dresm unlfonn# eepecially deeigned for
the occasion, attended a ball at Ix)ndonderry Hou#e#
Deeplte thim merriment, the dlacueglon opened
on June 4 aunld an atmomphere of pesalmlsm, Neither
the Brltleh prea# nor public opinion believed that a
substantial agreement co ,ld be reached* The German
ambassador, von Hoesch, was especially pessimistic.

owing partly to hla belief in the flrmneea of the
Brltlah policy md partly to hl@ lack of faith In
Rlbbantrop** diplomatic oxperlanca* Rlbbantrop* how**
over» prudently left the more technical aepeote of
the negotiation# to hie Wllhelmatraeae experte*
On June 18* 1955;, after almoet two weelw of
oon$t#nt negotiation*, the reeulta of the Anglo*Ger«an
naval dlecuaalona were publlehed* Oermany aeoured
the deelred 35# of Brltleh tonnage which mmournted to
near parity in the Horth sea area* The Srltleh were
euoeeeeful In getting the 35^ reatrloted to a per
centage of each warship category Instead of a etralght
36# of all Brltleh tonna&e*

Geneany aleo received

equal parity wllAi Great Britain In the building of
B5
aubmarlnee*
The agreement warn clearly a victory for
Germany and a peraonal trluaqAi for Rlbbentrop*
Rlbbentrop wae elated with hla eucoeee#

In an

Interview with the Mkncheater Guardian on June 23,
1935, Rlbbentrop eteted*
I believe thla naval agreement le the be*
ginning; of a practical peace policy* It
settle# the vital neval problem between
Germany and Britain once and for all* from

25
Document» on international Affelre, 1935,
I, 143*
26
Ibid*. 146^47*
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now on there will be no more naval rivalry#
It la woncierf i l to think what it #111 mean
for these two countries»
Now I will aay aomethlng more# I read
In one of yeaterdaya paper* that Germany
haa tried to drive a wedje between PYanoe
and Britain# Here I mnat tell you that we
in Germany completely fall to understand
auch queer Inalnuatlone* which aeem to w#
ratber email talk of people who cannot
free themeelvee from a pre-war, if net
antediluvian* mentality. I think we all
ought to try and be wiee and forget our
domestic troubles in the Old world# If
we all want the renascence of the #%st,
as Chancellor Hltlar said In his speech,
we must learni to think In a broader way
and mist believe in It#
And now, finally, you want to know what
the next step ml^t be* On this 1 will wke
a personal remark* People say I have made
it my life task to help bring about a close
collaboration between Britain, France and
Germany in whlob the other European states
would gladly join# I believe these people
are rlé^ht, and I am convinced we are on
the beet road now*
"Rts AngloMSerman Raval %reement was a personal
triumph for Rlbbentrop as well as for Hitler#

It

marlmd a turning point in Ribbentrop*# career, for
Hitler now looked upon klm as a "second Bismarck#^
Had not Ribbentrop pulled off a brilliant diplomatic
coup when all othere, even the most experienced
diplomats In the foreign office, had voiced the
opinion that It could not be done?

Hitler was jubilant#

He hnd legally broken the ^Diktat" of Versailles, for
technically the e^rreement constituted a violation of
that paf^t. The British appeared satisfied but not
entauslastlc# They considered the agreement as a choice
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between two evlla# They sigaed the pact with the
hop# that It would @md the naval rivalry between
tbe t#o coimtrlee and with the eonvlotlon that thl#
wa# the only way to limit Hitler*# naval %*earmament
policy»

The Rrenoh, on the other hand were unable

to hide their bitterness at what they oonaidered a
broken promlee and an obvious oonoe##ion to the
German dietater* A# a reeiilt* a rift appeared in
PranoofBritlah relation#,
Altho%igh much of the credit for thl# diplomatie
feat umdowbtedly belong# to Rlbbentropy the olroiw
atanee# of the time oontributed greatly to making hi#
taek eaeler* The Ifaahlngton Mkval C*nfe%*enoe #hlch
had eetabllahed the 5«B"5-1»1 ratie for naval di#*
armament wa# to expire the following year with ne
Indication that it would be renewed* %»ltalm^ there*
fere* realizlng that the Vereallle# Treaty could me
longer reetrlot Oermany*# naval reaneamemt program#
wa# forced to grant oonoeaalon# to Hitler in order
to commit him te a written agreement* Slw» alee
realized that Hitler'# naval armament ambition#
oon#tituted a serious threat to her naval supresmcj,
a threat which #he regarded a* more eeriou# tbam
the amaoyanoe of Frame®#
So it #eemm that the condition# and elrcum#tance#
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of the times probably had ee much to do with
Rlbbentrop*» success in london as his own diplomatic
ekill* B» that a# It may# the important reault of
the Anglo-^Oerman Naval Agreement in reepect to
Ribbentrop warn the high preatlge ae a diplomat that
he gained in the eyea of Hitler and the )fa*l leader##
It was clearly » turning point in his career and
paved the way for more important and more re#pon@ibl#
poeltion# to follow#
In reviewing Ribbentrop*# life from bl# early
year# to the beginning of hi# political career,
oertaln aepect# of hi# peraonality* attitude#» and
political development clearly etand out*

Ribbentrop

wa# a vain, arrogant peraon# aoclally and politically
ambitlou#. In the etruggle to realize theae ambition#,
h* exploited eve%*y favorable opportunity, a# the
manner in which he ae<luired hi# title of nobility
aptly demonatrate#»

On the other hand, the## trait#

were offaet by a winning charm, a oharm graced by
an air of dlatinction* Above all, and in contraat
with the other Nàtl# #ur3founding Hitler, Ribbentrop
was a man of the world, a cosmopolitan, widely
travelled and fluent in three language#. It wa# un*'
doubt#dly thee# factor# which accounted, at learnt in
part, for Ribbentrop*# rapid ri#e to Hitler*# favor*
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To the»# qualities was added Rlbbentrop*# policy
of never diaafreeiHg with his Fuehrer#
Tbeee #re Important feotow In Rlbbentrop'#
rlee to diplomatie oonaequence, but even more
Important in relation to the event# $Ailch followed
wae the growth of hie pronounced Anglophlllem#

Thle

fondneaa for Britain and the Brltleh people dates
from hie echool yeare In England# where he made
iiany iQaglleh frlende, and wae atrengthened during
hie etay In Canada and diirlng hie commerolal aotlvltlea
after the war. Hie auceeee In oonoludlng the Naval
Paet further convinced him of the aoundneee of hla
Anglophile view»*

CBAPTBR III
LONDON
Th# A%%lo*G#rman Maval Agreement of 1935 bed
been acceded to by the Brltieh not only la the hope
of aetlefylng Qermeny*# rearmexeent embltlone but et
the meme time of gaining e epeclflc end written
llmltetlon on Germeny*# rearoiement program*

But by

March 1936* the cloud# over Europe began to aeaume
e darker ampeet, Italy had begun to pueb her colonial
ambltlone In Ethiopia* when on March 7 In one of hie
many Saturday coupe Hitler announced Germany'* reoccupation and re*milltarl%atlon of the Rhineland.
To the Germen people* Bltlar gave the following

1
reaeone for hie action*
Rpance baa Infringed on the Rhine Pact
through e military alliance with the Soviet
Union and In thla manner the locamo Rhine
Pact hae loet It# Inner meaning and ceaaed
in practice to exlet* Geirmany regard# her*
aelf for her pert a# no longer bound by
thl# dlaaolved treaty#
In taking this action. Hitler insisted upon
the fundamental right of every nation to mecure It#
frontier# and to insure its defenee*

Hitler acted

contrary to the advice of the diplomat# In the
^Wagl Conspiracy _& Aggresalon, IV* 994*95#
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foï^igm office #nd the w&mlnge of hie top militmiy
leadera. Ribbentrop, on th.© other Zmnd, was practlo#lly alone In advielng Hitler that a more propltloue
moment would never again preeemt iteelf*
m the eame speech, Hitler propoaed both a
twenty«*flve year non-aggreeelon pact among the
weatem power* end the eetebllahment of a bilateral
demllltariaed zone with complete parity for both
Fifanee and Germany#

Hitler aleo hinted at the po#ai*

bility of Germany** returning to the League and of
hi# wllllngne#* to conclude an air pact#

H# mad# m

Important reeervation, however. In that he ineieted
upon the i*eetoration of the German colonie*, an issue
which wa# to b* mm excellent bargaining point for the
next few year**
The we#tern power# were euffioiently concerned
to convene the league Council in London to examine
Oermany'# violation of the Locamo Pact# %ie German
government aleo demon*trated anxiety over the eituatiom
and through the German ambaegador in London *ugge*ted
that Germany be invited to #end a delegate to the
oouncil'e meeting#* %e Britiah agreed, and once
g
Paul Schwars, This Man Ribbentron (New Torki
Julian Meaaneer, Inc•, 1Â5), 149# '
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&g»ln Jo&ohlm von Rlbb#ntrop appeared on the dlplAamtle
eoene, thle time a» head of the Reloh*# delegation
to the Leagtie Geuncll* the aame council from ehlch
Germany bad bitterly withdrawn three yeare before#
Rlbbentrop and hla delegation arrived In london
on Maroh 18* 1936# The following day, Rlbbentpop
delivered a twenty*flve minute apeeeh before %ie
Cornell In which he reiterated Hitler** previous con*
tentlone that l%&nce had broken the pact by her alliance
with Rweela and that Gerxmny waa more than anxloiaa te
ocme to an amicable eettlement with Pranoe#

Rlbbentrop

argued that beoaume of the PTench aotlon, Eooame had
oeaeed to exlet* Re alee repeated Hitler^a new offer,
giAaranteelnf oeace for twenty-five yeare, ae the
Bolutlon to Burope*e problem#*
Deeplte hie glowing epeech* whloh oame ae a
dleeppolntment to many becanee It did not elaborate
on Hitler*# propoaale, Rlbbentrop failed to Impreee
hie audlenoe#

That same afternoon and with little

deliberation, the Council voted to ceneure Germany*#
re*oocupatlon of the Rhlneland on the ground* that
it eonetltuted a eerloue violation of the Leoamo
4
pact* Rlbbentrop later attributed hie failure to win

3
fh® lew York Time## March 2Q, 1936, p* 1#
*Ibld.. March 20, 1936, p, 1,
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oaa# to the f»ot that ho epoke la Gormwrn
ana *a# therefore# perk»P* mleundeMtood#

After the

oenawe, the Cowmoll drafted * mémorandum calling for
a demllitarl«ed atrip In the Rhlneland and requeating
Germany to preeent her caee to the Hague Court#
fdhbentrop then flew to Berlin to confer with
Hitler, but returned a few day# later to Inform the
Looamo power# that Germany rejected everything In
the Council*» propoeala and that Germany would eoon
come forward with a plan of her own#

On April 2,

Rlbbentrop Informed the Council In vague term» that
(Germany propoaed not to Increaee her fbroe# In the
Rhlneland within the next four aontha* that Belglm*
and Praaoe ehould make elmllar pledg»#* and %iat aa
International oommlealon ehould be appointed to eee
$
that the»e promleee were earrled out* Bden promptly
Informed Rlbbentrop that the propoeale were not enough
and that further proof of Germany'e elnoerlty would
have to be forthcoming#

On April 10* 1936, Rlbben*»

trop left Ixmdon with no apparent plan# to return#
Rlbbentrop*# etay In I^xndon wa# not without mome
reeult, however, for ae the Mew %rk Tlmee remarked#

'^Ibld#. April 2, 1956, p# 1,
^Ibld.. April 4, 1936, p. 1#
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Kltl#r kms Jomchim von Rlbbantrop *nd bl#
other Agent# In London to thank for hastening
Mr, Edem*8 conversion to hie present view*
Sine# thoir arriv#! in London they hav# in
dulged in #. o»mgp&ign of inoreaming violono#,
donounoing to politici&na *nd influontiml
member# of eooiety the young foreign eeoretery
&e *
htmbly #ubmle#ive to order#
from Pari#*
%e end reeult, therefore, of the proceeding#
of the League Council #»# a formal ceneure of
Germany'# action in occupying the Rhineland# But
unforttmately the Council*# propoaed eolution# #oon
becmm# mired in committee# and their effect wa#ted
with the re#ult that Hitler came off with a bloodle##
victory while the etaggerlng League received another
devaetatiag blow*
On April 10;, 1966, the very able German
aadoaemador to Great Britain, Leopold von Hoeeoh, died
#udd#aly$ Ribbentrop wa# appointed hla eucceaeor but
not until Augu#t the game year, and he did not official*
ly occupy hi# po#t until three months later, a mo#t
izvegular procedure#

"Biere appear to be eeveral

reaaon# for Rlbbentrop*m reluctance to a#8ume hi#
London a##ignment#

Pir#t of all, the poeltlon of

State Secretary had recently been vacated and Rlbben*
trop had already expressed hi# deaire for that appoint^
ment* At the same time he had al#o wanted the
opportunity of goin^: to London to eecure Hitler*#
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long-sougfefc aîllaaee with Groat Britain#

Moreover,

Neureth firmly oppoaed Rlbbentrop am State Secretary
and threatened to realgn if Hitler confirmed It*
Secondly, there waa the queetlon of Rlbbentropf#
atatua while "Ambaaaador-at-Iairge" in Ixmdon, To ge
to London aa a mere ambaagador implied, to Rlbbentrop
at any rate^ a demotion in rank* Reurath bad alao
objected to Rlbbentrop*# going to Wndon aa '^Ambaaaador*
at'ilArge,** becauae It waa known at the time that the
Britiah government had objected to recelvlnt^ Ribben'»
trop in any other atatua but amba#aador#

finally,

Seurathg in hla anxiety to be rid of Rlbbentrop and
hi# meddleaome Buero and convinced that the miealem to
london would fall within three month», conaented to
a oompromiae whereby Rlbbentrop would officially go
to lAndon aa ambaaaador but would unofficially retala
his rank aa "Ambaasador*at*'I*rge*^ and thue could be
called upon by Hitler to perfoim varied and private
dlploomtlo chorea#
The reaction to Ribbentrop'a appointment aa

7
3chwara, ojg, olt#, 191*92.
See alao* PTanz von Papen, Nemoira (Hew York#
R* P# Dutton & Company, Inc#, 1955),372*'76#
See alao# Maicom Wuggeridge, Ed*, Ciano* a
Diplomatic Paper# (Londoni Odhams Press LlmTiiST"
Ba-66.
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mmbaaaador

varied*

It Irritated moat of the

career diplomate In the Wllhelmetraeee*

News report#

from London stated that Ike announo«neat of hi#
apoolntmemt was received "without regret but without
8

enthusiasm#*

The French Temp# commented that ^'he

Is credited with an almost Machiavellian genius for
hoodwinking the Brltleh by his good humor and person#
ellty" and went on to #ay that the news of hi#
arcolntment could be looked upon as a dangerous threat
9
to future Anglo^frenoh relations* At any rate,
Rlbbentrop*# Impending mission to London was viewed
by many with both Interest and anxiety as to what new
turn AnglO'^GeMsan relations ml^ht now take*
After almost three months of wrang^llng over
his diplomatic status^ Joaoblm von Rlbbent%*op finally
arrived In London on October 26, 1956#

TTpon hi#

arrival end clad in the brown uniform of a Magi storm
trooper» Rlbbentrop gave his welcomers a brisk Nael
salute and a short speech calculated to lay the
ground work for s future Anglo#German alliance#
10
H# stated#

8
%ew York Times. August 12^ 1936# p# 1,
^Ibld#. August 13^ 1936, p# 8#
^^Ibld#. October 27, 1936, p# 9.
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Germmmy wnafes the fri«»dshlp of Great
Brltela, a»d I thi#k the Bmglloh people
#e»t Gemmm frlemdehlp# The fuehrer 1#
ceaVlmoed thet the only real danger for
Zurope 1# lAo further epremd of oommumlam*
thet meet terrible of ell dl#em#e#.**#.*
terrible becettae the people oialy feellme
the dWimger Wiea It 1* too lete# Cloeer
oellmboratlon between our two oouatrle#
Im thl» #em@e is not only Importent, Wt In
my opinion, 1# a vital neoemolty 1» o«r
etruggle for upholding our olvlllaatlon and
culture## I am only too willing to do every»
thing I ean te help#
Thl# initial apeeeh waa Intended a# a trial
balloon, but contrary te Rlbbentrop*# expectation#
It met with nmdh adveree reaction# Similar to other

11
reaponoea, waa the reply of sir Auaten ChazAerlaln^
publlahed %ov«aber 4 In the Dally Teleeraïah. In whloh
he #ald$
If our frlendahlp be aought, let It be for
It# own aake* Ooxmon aynpathlea* comwn
Intereata, and a ooamon pwpeae are a more
atable and healthier foumdatlon for frlendahlp
than parejudloe and paaalon**#**#Ae verbal
oonteat# ef Naal and Belahevlk are not worth
the benea ef a Brltlah oremadier#

^^CbaaAerlaln, Sir Anaten, ie9&*l»5T ^ Civil
&*rd of the Admiralty, IBB6, DOO* Chaneeller of gkAmquer, 1D0»#1»06# m,?*, lê»».lBi4# Secretary ef
State for India# 1#1#*1$1T; Mcwber of #ar Cabinet,
19181 Chancelier ef Acohequér, 1@1@#1»#1* leader of
Bouae of 0#«men#, litl*19iS| Seoratary ef State for
Foreign Affair#, 1984*19W; Rrat Lord ef the
Admiralty, 1931* Ohanoeller of Reading imlveralty#
19S5-193T#
IB
Schwarz, og# olt#. 800#

Shu.a it S9©!MS thmt Rlbbentrop*# rather ostentatious
beginning in Ix)n(lon failed to strike the harmonlou#
chord he Imd anticipated#
TNhat, therefore* «ae the real aim of the Rlbben*
trop Mission to Londoaf

Sa answering this question,

one muet rely heavily upon Rlbbentrop'e post-war
teetlmony and the teetlmonlea of hie contemporarlea*
At Xfuremberf, Rlbbentrop teatlfled that he pereuaded
Hitler to eend him to London with the hope of bringing
home an alliance with Oreat Britain. Se further
teatlfled that a Brltleh alllanoe had been an Ide#
f^^ with Hitler for eome time and that the Fuehrer
felt confident that It oould be achieved at thle
13
time.
Granted that both Hitler and Rlbbentrop deelMd
an alllanoe with Britain* what form wae thl# alliance
to tak# and what warn Rlbbentrop^# attitude toward
%%land at the time that he took up hi# poet a#
ambaaeadort

fbr purpoae# of under#tending the Rlbben-

13
International Military Tribunal# ^lal of
Major War Qrlminal# Before the late matioaa'l' WITitarT
ïRrl1)ùnaï Nuremberg. 14 *ove3^r 1945 # 1 Ocfober
.""ÏZxtVï. f#ur#mGe"'"^lïeM&atlonal"ifilitary
WIEunal, 1947.1949), X, 836.59#
Pee al#o* 0. M# Gilbert, MurezAerg Diary Clew
Torkl Rmrrar, Straus, 1947), 830#
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trop mission and its eventual failure amd Rlbben*
trop*a changed attitude and the effect of this change
on Hitler*# deolelone, tbeee are Important queetlone.
Judging from Rlbbentropfe epeech at Victoria Station,
one could aeeume that th» real aim of his mission was
the alignment of Britain with Germany agalnmt Rue#la*
m this manner Britain could be neutralized^ and
Sltler could pureue hla policies In central and
eastern Europe unmoleated* Rlbbentrop told Win#ton
14
Churchill In 1937 that the term# of this alliance
would almply be# a permanent Anglo-Oerman naval parity
agreement along the line# of the 1935 agreement; a
joint guarantee of the low countrlea; and a provlelon
that Germany would a&ree to guarantee the eolldarity
of the British Empire, %r her pert^, Britain would
recognlee Germany ae a atrong power in Europe and not

Churchill* Rt# Hon, Wlnaton I#onard Spencer *
Britlah writer and Coneervatlve Party leader wbo wa#
preeident of the Board of Trade» 1908*1910; Home
Secretary, 1910-1911; Flrat Lord of the Admiralty,
1911*1916; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaeter, 1915;
Mlnlater of Munltiona, 1917; Secretary of State for
#ar, 1918"19S1; for Alr,1918""1901; for the colonie#,
1921«,Bg|^ Chancellor of the EKChequer, 1924*1929; Plrat
Lord of the Admiralty, 1930*1940; frim* Minister,
First Lord of the Treaeury, and Minister of Defease,
1940^1945; WK# defeated and became oppoeitlon leader,
1946; re-elected Prime Mini#tor, 1960; retired, 1956,
See also# Seabury, og. oit#, 56.
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Interfere In Hitler* a policies In eaatsm and centre1
15
Europe*
The eeaence of tble hoped»for elllmnee
eeema to have been merely #n ettempt to noutrellze
Britain end thue gain for Germany freedom of action
In eaetem BuM)p#,
A« to Rlbbentrop'e current attitude toward
Britain, there eeema to be little doubt that he warn
«till extremely fbnd of England and the Rnglleh people
Partial proof of thle wae eupplled In eome detail In
the preceding chapter*

furWier evidence has been

brought to light In the post*war memoir# of Herbert
16
17
von MLrkeen and Count Clano#
Dliicean^ who later
replaced Rlbbentrop a# ambaaeador to Britain, In #%*
preaelng hi# eurprlee at the failure of Rlbbentrop*#
ml##lon* atated that #ien Rlbbentrop left for England
he m»^# ^pro"Brltl#h to a degree boirderlng om anobbery#

^Wlnaton S* ChuMhlll* gathering Ptorm (Boaton
Houghton Mifflin Ce.» 1948)$ 822.25.
'
16
Dlrkaen, Herbert von
German Ambaaaador to
Soviet Dhlon, 1929-1933f Ambaeaador to Japan^ 1933#
1938# Ambaaaador to Great Britain (aucoeedlng Rlbben
trop), 1938*1939# Reelgned from German foreign office
1939.
^^Clano dl Cortellatao, Count Galeateo, Italian
Foreign Wlnlater, 1936*1943, Mu##ollnl*a aon#ln*law$
executed by the Ramla # 1943*
18

Herbert von Dlrkaen, Moaoo*, Tokyo, po^on
{ #onsan; TMlveralty of Oklahoma ï^'i^s'a, IfSsI,
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CiaïiO

in bis motea that la a. eonveramtloa be*

t#«#n himself and von Beurath the latter explained
Bltlerfa reloctaaee to believe in Britain## policy
of encirclement toward# Germany aa *&ue to the work of
Rlbbentrop, who every so often attempts to inject
19
Anglophile optlmlam into the Fuehrer,*
The date of
thi# convereatlon correepond# closely to Ribbentrop*#
arrival in london and lead# one to conlade that at
the outset Rlbbentrop waa unmietakably m thoroughgoi**
Anglophile#

The reversal of thi# attitude during the

twilight months of Rlbbentrop'a ambasBadorsblp was
later to have significant effect# on Kltler*# decision*
while Ribbentrop wns foreign minister*
At the beginning of hi# mission, Ribbentrop
attempted to ease the difficulty of his task by per*
suadlng the German press and propaganda ministry to
reduce the vigor of their campaign# for the restoratiom
of the Germa* colonies, Rlbbentrop knew that the
Brltieh government considered these repetitious and
unw#lcom* attack* on the British Bnplre a #erlou*
Impediment to closer relation# between the two countrle#*
Although suoce#sful in reducing this source of
friction, Ribbentrop nevertheless caused him#elf many

19

MUggeridge, ©£« clt*. 59*60#
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petty difficulties during the flret period of hla
stay In Londoa*

The first of hie troubles started

when be made his arrival speech on the danger of
bolshevlsm*

This led to Plr Austen Chamberlain**

retort which has already been meatloaed* but a further
repercussion was found enacrlbed on the walls and
sidewalks of London to the effect that "Rlbbentrop
80
must go** At the same time, people were being arrested
throughout London for throwing brick* through the
German embassy*# wladowe and shouting defamatory re*
21
mark# about Rlbbentrop*
Ribbeatrop*# speech on bolshevlsm also produced
a reaction in the House of Common#* The Communist
#*P,, William Qallaoher* caused a stir when he arose
and said "Rlbbentrop comes to Bagland with hand# red
with murder#* demaodimg that the newly arrived am*
22
bassador be driven from the country*
Rlbbentrop
complained bitterly to Bden about this criticism tn
the House of Commons^ thus setting some sort of a
precedent for complaining about the utterances of a
member of Parliament, somethln&i as Baen explained to
Pibtontrop, over which the Government had no control*
pm
Btw York Times. November 7^ 1936, p# ?,
^^Ibid.. November 7, 19&6, p. 7*
2*Ibld., October SO, 1936, p, 2,
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a*#plt# theme &mtl*Rlbbeatrep demoa*
etretloa*, be eontlaaed to meke uatectftal remerka
that bolehevlem «** the eommoa eaemy of both eeuatrle##
The situation finally reached sweh a poiat as te foree
Edea officl&lly to Inform Rlbbeatrop tbet *tbe Brltleh
goverameat refuses to ahare the Germea view of the
%
neoeealty of an *ati*cemmunlat oruaede,"
Theee lacldeat* ere ualmportaat eloagalde the
more elgalflceat heppealnge la European dlplomaer at
the time tut are related here to demoaetrate the ua*
favorable olreumetaacee uader which the Rlbbeatrop
mleeloa to loadoa *ae oomdaeted. These, and elmllar
Incidente ehleh took place later, all had their effeot
on the Brltleh gevernment and pwblle and eentrlbuted
la eome degree to the eldealng of the gulf whloh
eeparated Britain and Germany* But alnee a consider*
atlo* of the effect# of Rlbbeatrop and hla mieeloa
upoa the Brltleh public le beyond the acope of thl#
- project theme email Incldeata are brought to ll^ht a#
llluetretloae of the origin* of Plbbentrop*# later
Anglophobia*
Not ell of Rlbbeatrop*# early aoeompllahmeata
were recorded la red In the diplomatic ledger# for he

Ibid*. November 21, 1936, p* 1#
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managed to score at least three early sucoeaeee#

Aie

first, which could hardly be described as a major
diplomatie feat, waa to arrange for the exchange of
%ie London fbllarmonlc Orcheatra and the Dreaden Opera
24
Company between London and Berlin#
The eeoond and
more algnal success waa registered when Rlbbentrop
negotiated a naval agreement In lAilch Qermany agreed
to accept certain limitation# on eiAmaarlne warfare
which had been adopted by the Weetem fowera at the
London Naval Conference of 1930*
The third and mo@t crowning auocea# of thla
early period wae Rlbbentrop*a negotiating and algnlng
of the inti-Comlntem Pact in lR)vember 1956 between
(Germany and Jkpan*

The pact itself wae not a military

alliance ae many auepect^Wl at the tlm# but merely a
joint declaration on the part of the two countrlee
concerned to work together In combating the devlllah
work of the Comintern*

Bnt Ite effect amounted to a

detente between Oermany and Japan#

Ihe whole affair

24
Ibid## November 15, 1956* p« 1#
26
Frederick L* Schuman# Europe On The Ev# (Mew
lOrki Alfred A* Knopf# 1942)# 246»46#
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wmm an unumual piece of diplomacy* alRce It wa#
accompliahed without the participation of the Oenaan
foreign office and beca^ae the German algxmtory wae
not the German foreign mlnleter but the German ambaaeador In Ix)ndon, %e%rath told hi# po#t*war Inter"
rogator# that he refueed to #lgn the pact beca%#e he
regarded It a# a dangerou# policy for Germany and be"
cause it would only eucceed In driving China further
into the arm# of commnlam* Deeoylblng Rlbbentrop'#
#l0&lng of the pact a# **# moat imueual procedure#"
Meurath went on to #ay that Rlbbentrop ehould have
minded hi# own bualne## in thl# matter but Inetead
went out of hi# way to give the Brltlah a deliberate
elap In the face by algnlng the paot while he wa#
ambaaaador there*

Naturally the Brltlah had no use
26
for hi* after that#*
Rlbbentrop wa# alao aucceeefbl In hi# aotlvltle#
a# a memOaer of the *on"Zaterventlon Committee which bad
been eatabllshed ahortl^ after the outbreak of the
Spmlah Civil War in 1936# It wa# #upported by twenty*
#even European countrle# for the purpose of applying

B6
Gilbert^ op# clt*# 225"26#
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m policy of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict,
ïhle memnt essentially an attempt to prohibit the
flow of arma and foreign volunteera into Spain, When
Blbbeatrop took his place on the Committee, it *aa
hoped in London that h@ would boost its effectiveness since Ribbentrop after all was close to Hitler, But
from the vei^r beginning, Ribbentrop thwarted the
ooammnieta at every turn and time after time threw the
committee into deadlock and taactloa*
Rlbbentrop used the Committee a* a #o%nding board
for vehement attack* on the Soviet Union aa well aa to
inhibit ^e Committee** efforts to atop the flow of
fighting men from Qezwany into Spain*

On October 50,

1957, Rlbbentrop delivered a apeech before the Coamltte#
lAiich virtually wired away all previous propoaala advanced
27
to aolve the non-intervention problem,
%roia@kiiont the entire conrse of the prooeedlnga of
the llTon^Intervention Committee, Britain and Prance ahowed
a vacillating and aometime# compromialng attitude, There^
fore, it la quite poaalble that Rlbbentrop'a experience*
aa a member of the Committee constitute one of the vital
links in the formation of his belief that Britain was

27
lew York Tlmea, October 51, 1957, p,9,
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deomdent *nd reluctmnt to go to w»r, mm opinion l#t#f
to pl*y so Important & part In the Austrian, C&eoh,
and Pollmh oris**#

Even at thla time, artlclee

appeared In the Brltleh prege contending that Elbhem*
trop wae advlelng Hitler that the Brltleh public would
not tolerate military action agalnat Germany under
28
any olrcumatanoea#
% return to the chronology of the mleelon^
Rlbbentrop returned to London In f\»bruary 1957 after
ependlng w extended holiday vacation In Berlin* Ihe
London atmoeptiere upon hla return #ae leas favorable
to an Anglo-Qerman underetandlng than upon hie departure*
The new Brltlah coolneea wae due In pert to Hitler*#
recent #p$eeh In the Relchatag In which he eg&lm
attacked the "^Diktat** of Vereallle# and the loe# of
the Germen colonie#* Another eomewhat minor factor
wa# the work currently being conducted on th$ German
eaAaaey in lAndon# !îhe embaasy w$# ewamalng; with
woiinmen engaged In a va#t remodeling project aimed at
making It the moat lavlah modal center In %/»ndon and
at the earn# time ma outward algn that Germany wanted
clo#e relation# with Britain, Although hi# intention*
were no doubt good, thl# wa# but anothar Inatanc# In

28
Ibid*. November 28, 1956* p# 1*
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which Rlhbemtrop*# aohemlng worked out in reverse#
Over half the workmen bad been Imported from Germany;
they were beinf; houeed la extre^moomforteble quarte$*8,
paid e gOod eelery which wee aeat home to their
famille*, and In addition given an expense aocount In
excess of the amoimt paid British workmen#

Rpom

London laboring groupe# currently eixfferlng from
depression and unemployment* and from labourites In
Commene came loud protests beoauee British workmen were
29
not used#
Shis public reaetlon, however* did not
prevent Rlbbentrop from speeding up the work to ready
the embassy for his lavish coronation reception in
the spring#
throughout this same month, Rlbbentrop*# lll'^
luok continued to plague him#

It was on $%bfuary 4,

that be committed one of his worst blunders# Th#
oeoaslon was the oourt reception In which King Geot%#
VI received the heads of the dlplematic legations ïbr
purposes of accepting their credentials. During this
selesA procedure# it was customary for the diplomats#
escorted by the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, to

89
Ibid*. Bsbryary 4, 1937# p# 6#
^^Ibid*. May 16# 1937# p. 3.
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@lowly in & aorio* of bowa toward tbo king,
présent their credentiale, bow a%ain and aedately
retire#

Ribbentrop* however, in full evening dre##,

aaw fit ta depart from the eatabliehed procedure# Ik
advanced briakly# completely outdietancing hie eeoort,
halted aharply before the British monarch, olioked hi#
heele# and gave the kin^f the Bitlerian ealute#

H#

then forcefully ehook the king*# hand$ preeented hi#
credentiale, retired a abort diatanoe and rendered
another aalute* Aeoording to eye witneaa reporta, the
king although taking the matter calmly, amiled eome*
81
what laneaaily*
It ia difficult to explain why Pibben#*
trop put on thle untactful exhibition, but it ie
likely that he deliberately meant to affront the
country to which he wae accredited#

Rather, it aemm#

certain that the future German foreign mlnleter meant
te deeonetrete forcefully the trlrnqph of the National
Soclallat Revolution » without realising the reaction
it would create. It la, of oouree, a striking meaaure
of hla ineptitude aa a diplomat, and the wide publiol#"
ty it received in the preaa oonatituted another link
in the aeriee of Incidente contributing to Rlbbentrop##
growing bitteineaa toward Britain, After ell, no on*

Si
Ibid#, February 6, 1957, p. 1*
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CAR be more bitter than a "^nleunderatood" man*
From the very beginning of his mission, Rlbbem*
trop b*d unauocemsfully bomberded the Brltleh foreign
offloe with reqizeat# to t&k* up the leeu# of Oermmny*#
loet oolonle#*

On piebru#iry 11# 1937, b* took »dv#intaig#

of the fact that Ed#n ### on a holiday to confer #l@a
30
Lord Ballfax on the colonial problem* Much to hi#
aurprlae he received a atiff rebuff and was told that
Oreat Britain could not recognize Qermany*$ colonial
clalme or her repudiation of the Vermalllea Treaty.
Ten da;* later, gden gave him the eame anewer$ aecompa"»
nled by a proteet over Germany's failure to anewer the
Britlah qixeatlonnalre of the preceding November#

But

Rlbbentrop^ In a apeech at Leipzig on March 1» refueed
to refrain from hie loud claim# for Germany^e colonie#
aad aeverely denounced the country to which he *a#
accredited for refualag to settle the question ef
Germany*# "#tolen colonie##* "Zbe #peech wa# lll-re#
oelved la London aad aectlon# of the Britlah pre##

3B
Halifax^ Earl of (Edeard Frederick Llndley
Wood) - British Secretary of State for Pbreign Affair#,
1938*1940; Ambassador in Washington, 1941-1946# At
the time of hie Interview with Rlbbentrop, Halifax wa#
under Secretary of State for P»relgn Affair#,
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33
described It a# "very lll*tlmed#"
A fe* dmye later, Rlbbentrop'e vanity aad Anglopblll#* suffered another bio*.

In a gesture of friend

ship, Ribbentrop personally presented a moniasental
historical collection of B@00 volumes to loadon Uhlversl*
ty. But when he sirrlved on the campus to make tlie
presentation, he was greeted with boos, catcalls, and
54
jeers from demonstrating students. Since this Incident
was the first time within recent memory that a foreign
envoy had been jeered at In the streets of London, it
served to inform Rlbbentrop of Britain^s growing antl*
ITasl attitude and to Increase his bitterness and
hatred toward England*
Yet, by Qie summer of 1937 and despite Rlbben*
trop*s obvious failures, hope had not been abandoned
by the two gevemments of reaching and understanding*
Ernst von #elssacker, the state Secretary, stated in
that the foreign office felt that the
relations between the two countries oould be Improved
by a step^'by^step process, the first step of which
was to have been a visit of Reu]?ath to London In Jim#

^*Ibid.. March 17, 1937, p. 16.
^^Welssacker, Brnst, Baron von. Bead of the
Political Depax'tment of the German Foreign Ministry,
August 1936*March 193B; State Secretary, April 1,
l»38~Aprll 1943.
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1959#

the

i#m# to hav#

b«@m o@»e«m#d with the peealbllltlee of ei*»atimg
» miltllmter*! »eeterm pmet &ad with the eettlmg up
of & bipartite committee to reeolve the colomlel
laen** Bixt em th# eve of Ruerath*» <l*partur*. Hitler
eamoelled the vialt* The reaeom# Bitler gave #ere
exceedingly weak, mmd it aewae apparent from th#
Cla*o Pape»* that Qie real rwuwm #ae Italy*» fear
leet the vlalt weakem the fWme*Berllm Axle#

Clam#

himeelf etated that he ooQld aee R# neeftil purpoae
5?
to be aerved by Meixrath^g gol*g te I<»adomi*
#iat th#
%e%rath vlalt would have produced had it oceared imvitee lmt#re#tl»g epeoulatiom* byt aoeordlnf: to later
38
observera, 31r Kevill# Hemdereom for oae, the eancel^
latiea wa# m##t u*fortu«%te i% that it came at a time
#i#m oomditi^m# eeemed favorable for poachimg a»
imder#tamdimg*
Oa the other hamd# AmglewOermam relatione fared
b*tter oomoe%*lag maval matter#*

la July 19&?, th#

two ooumtrlM #ig*#d a maval agreement extemdimg th#
98
Ermet vo* ^^eitamoker, Memelre. tr$me* Johm
Amdrewe (Ohloag## Eemry Regaery b#*, l#51), 112#
57
Muggeridg#» jgg* o^t.. 033*04#
*^#md#r#om$ Sir %#vll# * Britleh Kimlater t#
TAigeélavla, 1909#1B5@$ Ambaeaador to Germamy, 1057»
1050j dl#df 1948.
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provlaloa# of the 1936 mivml mgreement to the rival
Baltic umvml powers#

It also restricted the aime

aad gun caliber cf «arahlpe» %e agreement wae hailed
in aermamy ae proof that the Reich deeired peace,
#^le im Lemdom it we regarded ae being better tham
notblmg#
Daring the e%mmer moniai#* efforte were comtimned
to bring ^be leadere of both coomtrle# to a comferemee
table, and finally in Kovemdser 1937 I*rd EaliAuc
vialted Berlin to confer directly with Bltler* Im
the oouree of the oonvereatiomej, Bitler reiterated hie
objections to the Veraailla* treaty and infomed
Halifax that mo agreement mam poeeible except on a
baaim of eqimlity and reality# He argued that the
colonial q%eetiom wae mo# the malm aource of frictlom
betweem Germany amd Brltalm, imeiatlmg^ however, ^ùat
this zAtter ebould be mettled bilaterally* Halifax,
mhoae mood mm# appeaeimf;# told Hitler that the et# tu#
quo im Europe did mot meceeaarily have to be maintained
amd that a colonial aolutlom could be reached mere it
done im a multilateral conferemoe* %ie oomveraatlon#
concluded with Halifax*# e%pre##ed hope that other
convereatiom# would folio# im the near future and with
Hitler'# reaeeertion of hi# dietruet of democratic
proceaae# and #tatememt that he would pursue the

•61*

colonial mattar tbroti^ji diplomatic ohannala, pra*
@9
ammebly via Rlbbentrop in London.
AlthOM^h tha convermationa pro&uced nothing
aanaatlonal or ooncrata, they ware raf^rdad aa
aatlafactory#

It warn olaar that Oraat Britain wa#

willing to maka concaaaiona on tha colonial iaawa*
Tha rub cama whan Hitler objactad to these laayaa
balng aolvad by a ganaral agreamant#

It la avldant

fr<Mi tha Racrat Confaranca on Gorman foralgn policy
which Rltlar hald juat prior to tha Halifax vlalt that
Ritlar waa convinced that Britain woiild not oartlclpata
40
in a war on tha continent#
Thla la «bat Rlbbantrop
had baan telling Hitler for aome tima, and Hallfax'a
compromlaing and conciliatory attltwle further con*
vlnced both Hltlar and gibbantrop of tha oorrectneea
of their via**#
Halifax in London later told Rlbbentrop that
Prltain waa willing to ma&$ concaaalona on tha colonial
l$mua but that the British peoola expected aometblng in
41
return, namely, a limitation on Germany*a rearmament*
^Ublted State#. Department of State, Dooument#
on German %relgn Policy 1918-1945, Sorlaa D,
V.
Govornsaat Priafcimg Office*
194$), I, 6M7#
^Nmzl ConaplracT^ Amkreaalo*. Ill, 296*505*
^^iDocumenta OB. Oermam Porel^ Policy. I, 124-28#
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Ribbeatrop

told the
thing by Neville
40
Chamberlain#
Rpom both oonvereatlome# Rlbbemtrop

concluded that the t#o men viewed aubaequent negoti
ation* with conelderable ekeptlolam and that Great
Britain would be extremely reluctant to go to war
46
over any continental laenee*
By the end of 1937^ Rlbbentrop wa# convinced
that hie mleelon had failed and that hie earlier
adml%*atlon of the Brltlah people had been a mletake#
Thla changed attltnde waa clearly evidenced In a
lengthy Kemorandim he wrote to Rltler In January 19584
Di thla document^ which contributed to hie conviction
at Nuremberg# he advlaed Bltler that Britain waa
b^Ailnd in her armament# and waa atalllng for time*
Be argued that the Brltlah government had not really
Intended to uae the Halifax viait to aeek an under*
atandlng with Germany# and he concluded %&at Britain
would not go te war* Germany conaequently ahouid
follow a policy of outwardly trying to further an
underatending, with her but ehould aecretly build up
an antl*Brltieh coalition* mainly witk Italy and

^^Ibld*. 131^34#
^^Ibld^^ 86*87*

44
Japan#
Rlbbentrop warn convinced, owing to the
blttemees with which he had com# to view Britain^
that further attempt* at reaehlng en umderetandlng
with the "Intolerable Brltlah" would be futile,
Rlbbemtropf* changed attitude became doubly
Important when It was ennounced on fbbruary 4, 1938
that* In the mldmt of a vaet cabinet and military
ahakeupg he had been appointed to ancceed von Reurath
a# foreign mlnleter. Important becanee he regarded a
peaceful eolutlon of Europe*a probleme with peealmlmm,
Ribbentrop*e hatred and antl«Brltl#h attitude were
net to #how their full effect# until a year and onehalf later when Hitler we# Influenced by hi# calamltou#
advice during the folleh crlel##
!Riere 1# no doubt that Rlbbentrop*# mleelon wa#
a failure, but why It failed 1# not #o clear* Did 1%
%*eeult from Rlbbentrop*# Incompetence a# a diplomats
Sir Mevlle Eendereon* who had placed much faith in Mie
propoeed Xeurath vlelt to lAndon and who con#l#tently
blamed Rlbbentrop a# a contributing force In the
deterioration of AngloHZerman relation# during: tbl#
45
period, #tated#

^*Ibld.. 162.68.
*^Nevlle Benderaon, M&llure Of â Mission (Hew
York: G* P# Putnam^s Son#, W4Ù}^
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visit of Ne«ir«thfs had never appealed
to Ribbeatrop beeauee Ribbentrop, in addition
to bis lAAdon poet* #aa AmAaeaador-at^Large»
and felt that We%rath*e visit would be detrir
mental to his o#n prestige and wounding to
his personal vanity# I feel that he did hi#
utmost to dissuade his Wkster from agreeing
to taie course proposed by his Majesty's Oovem»
ment# The notorious failure of his mission
was alrsady rankling, and it was Intolerable
that another should come to show up the
personal cause of that failure. History »111
assuredly at^ibute a lerge share of the
blame for September 1920 to Rlbbentrop#
46
At another point Henderson remazted*
Rpom the very beginning, I felt that hi# vanity,
hie resentment#* and his misoonceptions of England
and gkglish mentality were a serious bar to any
prospect of a better understanding between the
two eountries*
Ribbentrop hiisself, however* attributed the
cause of his failure to olrcumstances and attitWes
on the part of the British government over which he
had no control* Se stated to his post«"war interre*
47
gators:
Very often in my work on the Non*Intervention
Committee* I was obliged to take a stand against
the British* which was very unfortunate and
which* during my ehole stay In london* inter*
rupted very much of my real work* iihioh was*
trying to establish good relations with Oreat
Britain#

40
Ibid## 109#
AM
Nasi Conapiraoy & A^ggreaslon* Gupp# B**
1214-16.
~

Commenting upon the polltloel situation in Britain
as a deterrent to en Aaglo-Germen alllenoe, Rlbben*
48
trop went on to smji
In the year 1937, lAien I wee In I,ondon,
I a&w that two clearly different trend#
were gradually fomalng In Bnglandf the
one trend #a# very much in favor of promoting
good relatione #lth (Germany; the eeoond trend
did not *leh much cloee relation## There
were * I believe I do not need to mention
name## for they are well known * the## gentle*
men who did not wl#h aueh oleme relation#
with Germany, Mr# #ln#ton Churchill, who wn#
Inter prim# mlnleter, and other##
A# another factor for the failure of hi# ml##Ion,
Rlbbentrop malntnlned that beoRwa# of her conception
of the balano# of power Britain wa# reluctant to
enter into an alliance with Oermany*

2a thl#, Rlbben*

trop claimed, he dl##gre#d vlgoroualy with Hitler
who regarded the Iden of the balance of power a# old
4»
fa#hloned$
There are al#o the#* who argue that th# eoo*
nomlc l##ue wa# the dominant force which kept Britain
and Germany npart during thl# period* But a detailed
account of thle and other factor#, although laqportant
and no doubt significant, are neverthele## beyond
the llaltatioaa of this paper# Suffice it to eay.

48
Trial of Major Mar Criminal#. X, 238*59.
40

Document# On German For&im Policy. I, 187#
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therefore, that all the*# factors cornstitutôd a
blend In contributing to Rlbbentrop** London
failure*
There are, moreover, other more Important
factors to consider In evaluating the Rlbbentrop
Mleelon to London#

Plret of *11, Rlbbentrop came to

iXM&don an Anglophile and left an Anglophobe# #hyT
Thle abrupt change of heart can flrat of all be
traoed to the fact that hie mlaalon wa# a dleappolntment# Be had failed In what he bad eet out to de#
to eecur* an alllanoe with Britain along the line#
deelred by Kltler# %il#, added to tlie faot that hi#
pride and vanity were Injured by Brltleh reaction#
to hi# diplomatic alejndgement#, produced a bitter-»
nee# and hatred toward the country he had once regarded
a# a *#econd home#*
Secondly, whet wa# Bibbentrop## attitude toward
Britain at the end of hi# mieelonT

Rlbbentrop had

come to view Britain e# a weak, cowardly country*
lAoee empire wi# fast becoming decadent and who##
people were unwilling to go to war* Ee had been
led to these conclueion# by Britain*# vacillating
action# In the Non-intervention Ooumlttee, the
conciliatory and appea#ing policie# of Qhaniberlai*

*67and HmllfmXf and hie own conception of Britain*#
atate of preparedaeaa. It *aa on the baala of
theae oonolualona that Rlbbentrop began to advise
Hitler that he could wreak hla will In Europe
50
without fear of Brltlah Intervention, advice which
finally bore Its tragic fruit when Hitler Aeelded
to Invade Poland#

60
Pepen,

elt,. 376.

CHAPTER IV
mtOM VIENM TO PRAGUE
Rlbbeatrop m##umed the dutl## of Oommm
forelgm minister *t a critical poimt la Eupop#**
politics# During the court® of the next twelve
monthe, from March 1958 to Merch 1959, the vorld
eritneeeed euch hietorlo event* ae the Ameohluee. th#
Xhmioh Oomf#r#nce, and the liquidation of Caeohoel#'#
vakia* fo the foreign offle# Ribhentrep brou^t
hie recently acquired Anglophobia and conviction#
Wtat Great Britain #a# a weWc# decadent country#
led by a government that would avoid war at any coat*
Throughout thie period Ribbentrop etood a# the man
next to Hitler* hie cleeeet confidant#

Oem##quently

during the eneuing crimie^ Hitler took Rlbbentrop*#
advic# m#M and mere Into account in ahaping hi#
territorial policioa*

Ih #ach inetance, a# Rlbban-

trop*# advic# proved correct^^ Hitler became increaelngly convinced that hie foreign mini#ter*e
judgement of Britain and the western power# wne
infallible and that in Ribbentrop he bad a *#econd
Biemarck#"
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Ribbentrop entered the foreign office when
the Reme-Berlln Axle wee growing etronger and the
polioiee of Great Britain were becoming mor#
appeaelng*

Chamberlain wae atill convinced that

appeaeement held the key to world peace, and the
world was not yet aware that the Sa»! appetite for
territory wae Inaatlable*
Although Eltler publicly praleed Rlbbeatrop,
othere did not hold the new foreign mlnleter In
aneh lo'fty regard#

Von *e%irath, Rlbbentrop*» pre*

deceeeor, expreeelng #i:rpyl*<»

Rlbbentrop^e

appointment, explained Hitler** choice aa a reeult
of the Fuehrer*# deeire to be aurrownded by *yee mem
2
Rpeneole^kponoet, Rpench aWwiapador to Berlin# wrote
g
even more dlmparaglngly:

CowDlracT & AFj%reealon. Stipp* B$, 14*1
2PraDC0l8'»P0ncet, Andre, French Ambaasador In
Germany, 1931^1958; Ainbaamador In Italy, 1938-1940#
^Andre Rmncole^'poncet, %ie fateful YeaM.
trane. Jacqwe# I,eClereq, (Rew Ybric*
Bi^ee*
1949), 255.54,
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me# Mlmlater for A»r#igm
w««
aeithep pp®i»r»d mr flttw fer M# offle#*
Cultwr*lly mad
h* #*#
m#dioor## E%« Igmemme# of hl#torle#l «md
dlplom&ti«
### prodltiew#. Hi#
*l##lAm ## Àak####d#r to lA#d#m peeved #
y###Tmdl»g f#llur#) hi# p#%#(m#l #pit# »t
thi# ### t® f#l#lfy hi# #v#ry jw$g##m$ #f
@r*#t Britmim*# m#t#ri#l #md m#f#I rmonmrn*
%im# th#m ### the mmm ôf #bom Bitl#r ##ld,
## he ##gg#d hi# bead admlrlmgly# 'km i#
#m#rt#r th#* Bi###reW * S%#h mn #pp#llimg
eyror prove# bo# blind the Pwehrer ### te
mmm ##d event# #t #e very #o##at he ###
#bo#t to embeyk wpen the r##h##t of imdey»
t»klR$## Truly thl# Ribbe#trop# ebee he
l##ded te the #kie## ### te em»roi#e upem
hi# the #e#t @om#t#*tly Aef#rio%# i&flw«M»oe#
Deeplte re#etiom# of thi# ki»d to hi# eppeimt*
m##t* RlbbwBtfop meveHAelee# to<* %xp hi# t##k #ith
#othorlty #md d#teM#lm#ti##*

Be #m# rwolved to

geim beck fer the #l^U»elm#tr###e #e#e of the
preetige #ed premiaemoe th#t km hed beeR# heretefeye*
#o iMtFime*tmi im rednejmg#

B# ### el*e wwioim# te

«(oavert th# ##reer diplomet# vholeheertedly to the
%#tiomel 3o#iell#t Revelwtio»#

A# illu#tfetiem# ef

hi# method, Rlbbemtrop o* eeeeeiem *##embled hi#
diplemmt# im milltery f##hiom im th# eowrtymrd #md
p###ed im revie#* eelutim^ eeeh im tuwt#

Alee by

Blbhe»trop*s oommmmd, the bl#@k •republl^m* froek
mmtf eu#torn#ry ûm»» for po#t World #»r I Oerm*m
diplomet#* ##e di##eFded im fevor of # drnA blme
imiform, complete with gold Wttom#* mrm in#lgmi#*
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oak-leaf clusters and dagger* The new foreign
mlnlater, bowever, wae never entirely euooaaeful
In makln# ardent Nazi# out of the Wllbalmatraaaa
diplomate, who himorouely referred to themaelve# a#
4
"man behind foliage**
Rlbbentrop was In the foreign office less than
a month whan he flew to lAndon to wind np hie affair#
ae ambaeeador#

He arrived there on %kroh 10, 19%,

at a time when clrcumatamoe# In Brltlmh politic#
were conaldered favorable for an Anglo*Qer%aan under*
etanding* Great Britain wanted to avoid w#r am long
a# poaalble and #lnce the general eleotlon# were dye
In the fall, the Conservative leader# felt that an
agreemant with Germany would win more vote# than th#
lea# appeaelng pollcle# of Sden# And finally. Great
Britain wlehed. In the event war ehould eoaw, to b#
In a poeltlon to aay to her dominion# and potential
aille# that every po##lble meana had been exhauatad
6
to prevent It#

Paul Seabury, %be Wllhelmatraaae (Berkley!
Uhlvorelty of CalifornTa'":i^Wss,' 19Ki), S2•
6
Maw York Tlmea. March 9, 1958, p. 1.

.72.
Rlbbentrop, however, did not appear willing
to exploit this favorable situation# His attitude
wae eool a* he presented five rather hmreh demand#
to the Brltleh government#

In #%mma%7 they weipe*

i X ) Reetralnt of the British press In its attacks

on Nazi Germany,(2) recognition of Gkginaany*#
colonial claim# without the colonial queetion forming
the baelB of a general agreement,(5) Brltlah
aemzrance of non#lnterventlon in the affair* between
Berlin and Rome^^ (4) Brltleh eygqpathy for Oerman#
living outelde the Third Relah, and (5) recognition
of Oermany*# right to defend hereelf agalnet
6

Boletw^viem#
After preaenting tdaeee demande, Rlbbentrop'e
manner mellowed eoaewhat, and he epeat the reet of
hie vlalt attending luncheon# and converging wll&i
Brltleh atateamen# The Ironio part, however* warn
that while he wae apeaking In glowing terme of an
Anglo-Oerman imdeMtending, German troopa were
a*%%hing Into Austria*

Brltlah reaction wae bitter*

and the Brltlah preae in particular resented Rlbbw»»
trop*a apparent hypocrisy#

6
Ibid#. March 10, 1938, p* 15*
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a«ws &t th# Amacblue#. Rlbb#ntrop
left lemdem* eeylmg e# he deperted that he expected
to return eftwm# A# e reeult* the Angle-Germem
diacueeleme nbleh were to hmve tmken piece et tbl#
time vere peetpomed Indefinitely*

Thl# wee prebebly
7
fortunate^ fer e# the %ew %rk Time# recorded*
There eppeer# te be e meed throi^hout
Greet Britain that mlg^t even reault In
an eacpleelen If the cenveraetlena #ere
reeumed In the neer future#
Whatever Rlbbentrop*# Intention# In going te lAmdem
hi# vlelt eceempll#hed little end did much to harm
Àngle-Oerman reletlene#

It em# generally felt

threug^eut Britain that Rlbbentrop came te tonden
to dlatract Brltlah attention away frwn event# In
Auatrla* El# friendly manner ea# Interpreted a#
an ^ungraclou#* and *treacherou#* performance#
Before Rlbbentrop left I^nden^ he conferred
with hie ambaeaador, Herbert von Dlrk#en* Dixit#*:
ebeerved that during tbeee convereatlen# Rlbbentrop
#poke of the need to foeter friendly reletlon# with
Great Britain and to convince her that German claim*
on Austria were justified»

"^Ibld#

Dlrkeen noted that
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Rlbbeotrop epok# with Ill-will toward# Britain but
failed to express amy bittemeaa at th# failure of hie
6
mimeion#
Dlrkaen warn under the impreaeion that Ribbemtrop wa$ uelmg hlx* aa a eereen to conceal hie true
attitude and intention# toward th# Britleh government#
But while It appear# that Rlbbentrop intentionally ml#led the Brltiah^ the fact# do not #ee« to euiqpert thi#
a##ertlon*
While Rlbbentrop wa# in I,ondon, von Meurath wa#
called back to the foreign office to take charge of th#
diplomatic detail# of the ànachlu##* Yet Rlbbentrop'#
name appeared on the Oermmn*»Au#trlan Treaty of Re^Vnlon*
aigned #iile Rlbbentrop wa# #till in Ix)ndon, Th# queetlon#
therefore^ ariee#^ why wa# Rlbbentrop ab#ent from hi#
poet at #uch a crucial tlm#? ??a# it becaua# Hitler pre»
ferred the more experienced von Neurath* or wa# Ribbentrop*# roi# te be in London to euehlon the Britieh
reactlont

Or wa# It po##ible that Rlbbentrop knew

nothing of the inachluay until after it wa# an acoompllahed
factT To find an anawer to theee que#tion#^ It 1# firet
neceeaary to briefly review the circum#tance# and event#
l##dln6 to Hitler*# amirch on Vienna#
On February 15, 1958, Hitler called Chancellor

8
Herbert von Dirk#em* Mo#cow, Tokyo. London
(Norman* Oklahoma: tlhlvereity @F oMahbS "I'ress52},
194-95*
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Schttschnigg

to Bartohesgadôa»

Among other demanda,

Bltler Ineleted that certain membere of the Austrian
3(agl Party he included in the Auatrlan cabinet* fblle#Ing these dlecueelone# tenelon ever the Auetrlan queetlon
mounted eteadily* Finally in March 1938,;, Schuschnlgg
anno^moed that a plébiscité would be held to decide
Awtrla*a fate* But t*o daya befere the aoheduled
pleblaelte# a German ultimatum waa delivered to the
Auatrlan govermeant demanding cancellation of the pleblaclte and realgnatlon of the Austrian chancelier*
Schuaehnlgg, lacking popular aippert, had no choice but
to comply with the German demanda* hereupon, Seyaa»
10
Zhquart*
Kazl leader of the Auatrlan provlaional govern*»
ment, telegraphed Hitler requeatlimgr German troope to re*11
atore law and order In Auatrla*
Hitler complied on
March 12, 1938, and on the following &&y the I*w of Re*
union waa algned. Integrating Auatria with Nazi Germany*
It aeema apparent, therefore, that although the
Anaehluaa had been Eltler*a objective for a<%ne time, it#

^Sehuacimigg, Kurt von, Austrian Federal
Chancellor, July, 1934*March 11, 1938#
^^8eyaa*Diquart, Dr# Artur# Auatrlan Natl;
Minlater of Ihter1er in Schuachnlgg cabinet, February
15, 1938; Auatrlan federal Chancellor, March 18, 1938;
executed at Nuremberg October 16, 1946.
^^Documenta on German Porel«n Policy* I, 680*
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time table had not been definitely eetabllahed; and
that Hitler, realizing the favorable turn of events,
acted swiftly and without consultation with hi#
adviser# In order to present the western powers with a
fait aoeompll before

could Intervene*

On this

bael#, therefore, Rlbbentrop'e presence In London at
the time of the Aamohlus# appear# aoeldental.
Although Rlbbentrop probably did not know of
Hitler*# exact Intention to march on Vienna, he neverthe*
1$## had earlier advised Hitler that If Germany sought
a forceful solution to the Austrian problem, the wester*
power# would not Interfere#

Rlbbentrop, two day#
%2
before th* Anschlua## wrote from London*
What will Bngland do If the Austrian problem
cannot be settled peacefallyT Basically, I am
oonvlnced that Rngland of her accord will do
nothing In regard to it at present, but that #h$
woQld exert a moderating Influence upon the other
powers# I believe %$iat the Rpenoh would not go
to war now over a Oerman solution of the Austrlam
question, and neither would the allies of Prane#
nor Italy# %# prere<Luislte, however, would be a
very quick settlement of the Austrian question#
If a solution by ibrce should be prolonged for
any length of time, tdiere would be danger of
cornqplication##
Ribbentrop*# memorandum leaves little doubt a#
to his opinions regarding; the strength of the western
powers# He was also convinced that the key to avoiding
western intervention was a swift and forceful solution

^^Ibld#. 265.
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to th# Austrian problem^ a move that should aot be post*
poned* That Rlbbentrop advised Hitler Is well established*
but to assess the extent to which his advice influenced
Ritler's decision to annex Austria is more difficult#
But this muoh is certain* within a few days, Bltler re*
sponded to the advice set foi*th in the foreign minister's
mote, observing the suggestion that It be a quick solution*
Airthermore, considering the confidence that Rlbbentrop
then enjoyed with the ftiehrer, it se*ms logical to asswse
that his influence was more than negligible*

After all,

%wior to this. Hitler had depended heavily upon hie
foreign minister for Infozmation concerning Oreat Britain
mnd the west and he bad no reason to believe that Rlbben*
trop was WM;ng on this occasion*
%rou^out the spring of 1638, various attempts
were made by a%*eat Britain to reach a detent4|» In her
relations with Oermany* To foster an understanding, the
British were willing to make concessions, especially
oonceMaln^ the colonial problem* Hitler, however, seemed
unwllllnr to negotiate and repeatedly told Henderson that
no understanding could be resohed until the campaigns
sgalnst him In the British press ceased# Although other
factors undoubtedly played their part, Rlbb#ntrop clearly
exercised an obstructing Influence upon these efforts to
bring about an Anglo-German rapprochement* The effect of

.78*.
Rlbbentrop^a tdvlcm upon Hitler In thlm regard 1$ In*
13
barmnt In th# remarks of Otto Dl#trlch, Hltlar'e
14
pre** chief, when he wrote*
Since Rlhbentrop*# return fMm landon, Hitler
has displayed Intenae dietruet of England - In
marked eontraat to hie former attitude. It la
tru# that I r#o*ll oonvereatlone In which Hitler
commented aaro&atloally ui^on Rlbbentropf#
exaggerated hatred for igngland* But Rlbbentrop*#
on# elded appraleel# moon be^m to b#v# their
effect* Ae Sitier becaLme aware of saglmnd'e
etlffenlng attitude toward hl«, he fell more end
more under the away of Ribbontrop*$ Anglophobia#
It la not laplled that Rlbbentrop caat a epell over
Hitler, for the Pbehrer was not # weak pereomall^ who
could be led to and fro by hla advlaera#

But at tAi#

ëaae time, a# Eitl#r*e confidence In Rlbbentrop Inoreaeed
he depended

and more upon the advice of hla foreign

mlnlater, aspeolally In matter* concerning Rreat Britain#
Ih the eummer of 1058, aa the Ceeoh crlela became
more acute* Kltler, Rlbbentrop, and the GeAaan foreign
office were not without warning eoncemlng the #erlou#n###
of the aituatlon and what Great Britain*» remotion might
b# in event of a oo%%fllct#

Prom London# von Dli^aen

conelatently advlaed Rlbbentrop during; the aummar of 1#&8
that unleea Germany and Great Britain reached agreement

^^Dletrich, Dr# Otto* State Secretary and Head of
Preaa Dlvlalon in jRelch %lnlatry of propaganda; Reich
Preaa Chief of Nazi Party*
^^Otto Dietrich, Bltler (Chicago# Henry Regneiy
Company, 1955), 40*41#
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oon* war could not be avoided, Dliicaen further
*utloned that he was convinced that If Qeremny reaorted
10 military mean# to aolve ^e Czech queatlon» England
15
fould ^Sflthout a doubt" go to ear on the aide of Prance#
Rlbbentrop, however, placed little value on
ilrkaen^a advice and paeaed It off aa "'astonishing* end
Were three te*" He continued to aasur© the Ftiehrer that
(heee In authority In Oreat Britain #ere half-hearted In
heir attitude toward central European probing and could

le
te relied up<w% to back down at the laet minute,

from

onvereatlona with Hendereon* Rlbbentrop even concluded
hat @reat Britain would undoubtedly etand aalde In the
vent of a CeeohvPranoo-Oarman conflict#

Rpom Rlbbentrop'a

IplAwtlo correepondence# it la apparent that he tried
o elicit a etatemant from Brltlah etateamen to the effect
hat Oreat Britain would not enter a eonfllet over Oeeoho17
lovakla*
It la peaalble that Rlbbentfop wanted to prove
15
Documenta On German Foreign Policy# II* 595#
See alao* Docimente on German PorelRn Policy# I,
.15S.69#
^
^
w# 8eton*wataon. Prom Mimloh To Daneig (london*
[ethuen & Co# Ltd, 1959)» til::
17
Gordon A# Craig and Felix Gilbert^ ed#* fhe
i^lommta (Princeton* Princeton IMlveralty Pre##, 1955),
See alao# Document# On German Porelxn Policy# II#
77, & 409.11#

^0*

aonclualvely tbrnt the Brltleh would not rlmk a war over
»#ntral European problem# and thereby aho* Hitler that
khe leea bellicoee #aflm were wron^ In fearing British
Laterventlom*
Rlbbentrop# to Inaure that view# contrary to hie
>w& regarding, Britain*# probable %h»aotloa In event of
)onfllot did not preval], dleeemlnated In late ewener of
18
L95B, the following; circular to all hla foreign mleelonm*
Ae you know, intensive foreign propaganda hae for
eome time been epreadlng the fable that Prance would
Inteznrene In ench a eaae and that Great Britain
would not etand aaide# TOkle propaganda leave# wa
cold,;, and I aek you not to let youreelvea be
InfIwenoed by It 1» any way* I a* convinced* and
have repeatedly given expreaelon to hla, that
third power would be ao foolhardy to a.ttack Germany
in much à oaae, I expeot yon to exprea# thla in
yowr convereationa, nattrrally a a being your
conviction aleo*
Ehle circular and the manner In which Ribbentrop treated
)lrkmen*a advice well reveal how intolerant he waa of
contrary opinion# and bow atrongly he dealred that hla
&he#le of Britain*a weakneae be accepted,
throughout the summer and fall of 193$, the Cme^
)reblem continued to be the major concern of European
xtateamen#

In September 1938$ Hitler and Chamberlain

met for three oonfereneea deaigned to arrive at a lamtlmg
settlement of German olaima on Caechoalovakia»

Rlbbentrop,

lowever# due to the objection# of Chamberlain, waa denied
^®Docimenta On Oeiman Foreign Pollor. II, 800*

*81^
19
ma offlelâl roi# In th# dlscusaioa». Bitter, the foreign

minister attempted to exercise am influence from the toaekgrowBd#

Weltaaeher related that Rlbbentrop*# attitude

during the Munich Oonferencee *a# extremely belllcoa# and
lAiat he repeatedly advleed Hitler to be harsh with Idno
Brltleh, adYOoatlng war if neceeaary. Ih faot Rlbbentrop
90
aearned to prefer war as a final humiliation on the British»
Strangely enough, the Munich Oonforence repreeentod
a low #bb in Blbbentrop's Influenoo with Bltler#

At Wunleh*

the Fuehrer wae not alway# mure of hlneelf and of Ribbontrop'#
advlee that the Weet would do nothing in regard to C%$cho*
elovakla# Alao^ Hitler etlll demonatrated a tendency to
follow the leaderehlp of Muaeollni»

He aleo felt that

war at thia time would not have the necemeary popular
eupport In Germany#

It could aleo be that at Munich Hitler

w#e teeting the Weet to eee exactly how far he oould go*
Be that ae it may, thla much le certain; Munich amply
aubetantlated Rlbbentrop^e conviction# and convinced Hitler
that the westers, leader# were "little worm#" who would '•
never go to war over Cmechoalovakia# For ae the Mew %epk
81
Time# recorded In October 1938#

20
Em#t von Welzaacker, Memoir#* trans, John
Andrew# (Oiicago: Henry Regnery Company* 1951), 150*55#
21
Mew York Time# » October 14, 1958, p# 1$
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view held In London la that H#rr von
Rlhb#ntrop, who is the la&der of the antl-Brltl#h
forces In Berlin, now enjoy# the 100% confldenoe
of the Ch&noellor because the Foreign Minister
wm# right in predicting that Britain and Prance
would not go to war under any c Iroumatancea at
the preeent time*
Hitler moon became diapatlefled with Munich*
regretted that he had not demanded more# Be reeumed hi#
attack# on Britain and the Brltleh prees»

But with

Hitler*# change in attitude came a atlffening of Britiah
policy#

The Britiah felt that Hitler wa# to blame for

the rapid deterioration in Anglo^Qenaan relation# becauee
he had not taken full advantage of the favorable atmoaphew created at Munich* Goneequently, Europe once mo%»e
faced the threat of wir#
Rlbbentrop alao wa# dlaappolnted in Munich# He
felt that Hitler had not fully exploited the Weatem
power#* A# a reeult, Rlbbentrop put two theme# into olz%ulatlon* flrat^ that Germany had not fully exploited the
weat*# fear of war; and aecondly* that Bngland bad uaed
the Munich Conference to gain tim# In order to atrlke at
a later date^ when #he waa better armed#

Although there

1# no apecific evidence to bear It out* it would probably
not be far fr«m fact to conclude that Rlbbentrop, with
theae two contention#, wa#, to a large degree, responsible
for Hitler*# changed attitude*

2È

Weizsftcker, og$ olt », 156«
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âft®r Munich, and throughout the wlmter of 193839, Hitler and his foreign minister continued their
efforts to keep the western powers apart*

In December

193G* Rlbbentrop went to Paris to sign the GerMm-Frenoh
Declazmtlon^ a document deolaring that no outstanding
territorial differences existed between the two countries »
Rlbbentrop ooncludad from this that France Imd rwounoed
her Interest in eastern Europe and would limit her affair*
23
to her Empire#
Rlbbentrop also Interpreted the Germa&Frendh Declaration as a major division in the relation#
between Paris and London* With these oonoluslons, and
mindful of the weaknee# the West had displayed at Blunidi,
Rlbbentrop advised Hitler that he oould now solve the
Gmeoh question without fear of Intoiventlon*
Rlbbentrop*s advice eventually found its mai** for
in #aroh 1939 the ozeoh crisis oame to a head, the Oenmaa
press increased the vielenoe of Its propaganda denouncing
alleged atrocities occurlng behind the Gaedk border*
Slovakia and Ruthenla declared their Independenoe of Prague
and appealed to Gennany for protection#

finally, on Mkreh

23
AH*, ^71*
For text of German-French Declaration sees
I^cuments On German Fsreiga Policy, I?, 470.
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IS, 1999, Premldent Haeha flew to Berlin In en attempt
:o stay Hitler'e hand#

His effort* were ia vaia, however*

lecauee while the Cxeeh president wae conferring with
lltler and Rlbhentrop, German troop* marched into Pra^e#
%e capitulation of Prague once again proved to
Kltler that hi* foreign mlnlater wa# right, for apart from
rerbal proteete the western powers stood still* Although
Aere are no document* to prove that Rlhbentrop** advlc#
Ml* the leajor factor In Hitler** deolelon to march on
»rague. It 1* not difficult to make thl* conclu*Ion#

TEhe

mechluaj* had Increaeed Hitler'* confidence in Rlbbentrop**
idvlce and Munich had conflnaed It»

Rlbhentrop preached

I doctrine of Britain** moral and material decadence* a
lootrine to lAtieh Au*tria, Munich, and Prague *eemed to
}ear ample teetlmony# The occupation of Pi»gue and the
*lnal liquidation of the C$ech *tate therefore eonvinoed
IItier that he had a free hand in Rurope and aerved to #et
Ale etage for tl%e final act

the deetruetion of Poland#

24
Hacha, Emil, Preeldent of Czechoaloveklan Supreme
;ourt, 1985; member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
it %e Hague; Prealdent of the Ceeohoalovak Republic,
fovemker 30, 1938 to %Krch 15, 1939»

(BAPTER V
FRO* PRAGUE TO DANZIG
Prmgue, remultlng in the flnel dlemembermeat @f the
Czech 3tate* again proved to Hitler the correotneaa of hie
foreign mlnlater*# advice concerning the reaction# of the
western pcwere*

Rlbbentrop »ae eoneequently elevated In

51tier*# eoteem#

Bow having seen demon#trated tble new

evldenoe of British and Frenoh weakness* Hitler eonfl»
dently tiimed to a settlement on the Danslg problem. And
as In the Csech orlals, Mbbentrop from the beginning
assured Bltler that he woiild have nothing to fear from the
west In forcing a solution of the Polish question*
But Prague had at last brought about a change In
lùie attitude of the British government# Mille wamlng
that be would never again believe In Hitler's assurances^
Neville Chamberlain announced Britain*s peace efforts
would be based on armaments and protective defense# To
Rlbbentrop, still posing as Hitler*s expert on Great
Britain, these warning went unheeded#

And therein lies

the tragedy of the opening of World War II#
Before turning to the Danalg question. Hitler and
his foreign minister decided first to settle the problem
"86—

""86—

of Kernel#

On Kerch 81, 1959, seven days after th#

ocouprntlom of fregue end under heavy Oermam preeeure*
Hthuamle eurrendered Memel to Maml Germany#

Weetern

reaction wa# ellght, the reeult %!ot eo much of the ewlden*
neee of Hitler'a action ae of the fact that Xmael r#^
preeented one of the moet legal of Hitler** clalma*

Pbr

a long tlm#. It had generally been accepted throughout
Burope that Lithuania had little juetlflcatlon In retaining
%il$ email territory bordering gaat frueela* With the
Memelland placed on the rack wlldi the %ilneland, Auetrla,
and Ozeehoelovakla# Hitler and Rlbbentrop beg#n to oonco6t
a oaae for the annexation of Danmlg*
ghe @e%%an-Polleh problem, eo far ae It concerned
%k«l <3ermany* datée from 1954, ehen Hitler, In an effort
to relieve exletlng ten#lone, concluded a ten year nonaggreeelon pact with Poland* From 1954 to 1938, relatione
between the two countrlee followed a relatively mnooth
couree#

But the Anechluee# the Munich Oonference (to

which the Pole* were not Invited), and lAie capitulation
of Prague revived old anxletie# and ceneed the two
countrlee to drift rapidly apart#
Shortly after taie Munich Conference and In a convereatlon with Mpeki, the Polleh ambaeeador, Rlbbentrop eet

^Llpeki, Joeef, Polleh Ambaaeador to Germany,
November 16, 1934 to September 1, 1959#

,^7.
torth the Germ&m claim to Dasaig &md proposed that# (1)
Danzig be Incorporated within the Third Reich;(2) extsmterritorial roada and railroads be built across the
3anzlg territory and acroaa the Corridor by Germany and
Poland# (S) Poland have a free port in I3»n«lg; (4) th#
frontier# be mutually guaranteed; and (5) the Ron*Ag2
^reaaion Paot be extended to twentyfive yeara#
Lipski
replied no agreement wa# poaaible ao long aa Germany
3
demanded the incorporation of Danzig*
Ih January 1939, Ribbentrop went to ivaraaw for a
bhree day via it under the pretext of repaying a recent
4
3eok viait to Berlin* Since hia attitude waa unuaually
Criendly (he apoke in glowing term# of Germany*# fondneaa
For her foliah neighbor) Ribbentrop'# main objective aeem#
ko have been to draw foland into the Anti-Oomintem Pact*
ro thia euggeation* and in reply to ^e propoaala pre*
yioualy aubmitted to I,ipaki# Beck gave hie gmeat a atrong»
ly worded almoat wholly negative reply# And thup with the
Failure of yet another miaaion, Ribbentrop left Waraaw

a
L, B. Marnier, Diplomatic Prelude# 19g8-»1939
[ L o n d o n # K a c N i l l a n & C o # , ^ 'E t d * ' » ' " 1 § % ' ) '
^Ibid*. 40.
*Beck, Josef, Poliah Foreign Minister from 1932
to 1939*
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"gremtly diaoontentod," displaying "ooldnaaa #md 1115
bumour#"
In Mmrob 1039, Rlbbantrop again coaveraed with tb*
Pollah «uËb#aa#idor, but oa tbla oeo*alon hla maimer *&a
ab&rper amd more demandlrng# He Imalated that bla earlier
proposals were atill viewed by the German government as &
Bine

nom In amy dlaenaalona seeking a aolwtlon to the

Daneig queatlon* At the oonvera&tlona* end, Rlbbentrop
[landed tlpakl & note embodying; bla earlier propoaala and
6

requ*ated an Immediate reply*
Beek replied to tbe German note on March 25$ 1939
by getting forth a coxmter-propoaal providing for m jolmt
Qerman Pollah guarantee of Danalg to aeo%%^ both the
polltleel and economic rlghta of Dentlg aa well aa the
rl^jhta of the German and Pollah population# within the
Danzig territory* Beok'a note mad# It elear that w#re
Demany to peralat in demanding the incorporation of
D#n%lg into the Third !?eich, Poland aaw no eaay aolution
of the problem*
Beok*a refuaal to bow to Plbbentrop^a demanda deadlooked Gei%an-Pollah negotiation#* and the aitwation rapid
ly a#atim#d crisla proportion#* To Rlbbentrop*a aatonlaha#nt and aager, th# next development came from London*

^Marnier, og*

68*

g
%zl Conspiracy & Aggreeelon. VIII# 492*04*
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Pollowlmg a brief visit by Beek to Gr*#t Britsia, #%#
Britigh goverxmont mnnoimcod on April 6, 1959 the
conclu#ion of am Aaglo*»Polish Pact*

Referred to #a the

'^blemk ohedk* of #)rld War II* thi# agreement provided
that Poland and Britain were to give each other mutual
a##i#tanee ehould either or both partie# be attacked by a
7
third power» Thi# unre#trained guarantee to Poland re*
preeented an almoat umbellevable change of policy om the
imrt of the Chamberlain government, for it wa# the fir#t
time Britain had ever unreeervedly given a military
oommltment to an ea#tern European power whoee geographic
poaltion obviou#ly rendered direct Briti#h help impo##lble«
Thi# development in what now becamie a three-cornered
Poll#h problem gurprlaed both Hitler and Ribbentrop*
After the war, Ooerlng recalled that the conclu#ion of the
Angl0"f0li#h Aict ^^aade a deep impre##ion on Hitler*
but not to the point of convincing him that Britain would
8
go to war#
Similarly taken aback by the Pact, Rlbbentrop
likewi#e refuaed to believe that Britain would intervene
in th# event of a forceful aianexation of Danalg#

Von

Papen, for inatance, apoke with Rlbbentrop on April 7,
1939 and concluded that the foreign mini#ter wa# #till

\a*l Conapiracy & AKKre##ion. VIII, 498-94.
6
Masl Conspiracy ^ AgAreeaion. I, 719.

9
eonvlnced "that Greet Britain was only bluffing."

Mor

lid Rlbbentrop** attitude change during the next month,
mince he told the Eungarlan prime mlnlater "^that It wa#
ale firm conviction that^, no amtter what happened In
10
Europe* no apench or Bn^lleh soldier would attack aermany*''
Hitler anewered the Anglo^Pollah Pact In hie
Relchatag speech of April 28, 1^39, After dwelling
orlefly on the juetlficatlon for him action in Cmeche#"
mlovakla. Eltier turned to the Pollah queetlom* He etated
;flth regret that alace Ck'eat Britain eaw fit to oppeee
aermamy over Poland he therefore had no alternative hut
to denounce the Angle»Qer»*n Naval Agreement of 19*5#

In

concluding, Hitler reatated the German claim to Danelg,
ance more Inalatln+t that a aettlewint could be reached
11
only on the baala of the German propoaale*
On the eame day am Bltler*a apeech, Rlbben^pop
notified the Polish govemm^t that hie demanda muat be
the baela of any agreement* The Polea anewered In May
flth the aesertlon that they aaw no contradiction between

g

Fraag von Papen^ Memoir# (New Torlcf E.P» Dutton
k Conqpany, Dtc#, 1953),
See alao: Marnier,
^^%ami Oonaplracy
13

*11*, 155,
Aggreeelon. VII, 192,

R. We Seton4.Wat@on, grow Munich To DanzlA (London#
Kethuen & Co#, Ltd#, 1999),
.
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th# Anglo-follah Pact and the Oerm&n^Pollah Agreement of
1934#

%» Polish note further argued th»t the Polish

goverruwnt viewed the Germmn dem&nde ee an ultimatum^
it would never willingly gee ï^aneig become part of the
12
German Reich*
In Hitler*# epeeoh and T?ibbentrop*9 dlplomatio oorre*
mpondenoe» it aeem# apparent Qiat* deaplte Poland*# refueal
to eubmit to Qerman preaeure and Britain*# hardening polloy
K# Indicated In the AnglomPoliah Pact, both Hitler and
Ribbentrop ateadfaetly refuaed to believe that their
motion# would preolpltate a general war in Europe#
Hitler*8 confidence in (Germany*# poeltlon vi#*a»vi#
Chreat Britain wae Increaaed a# a reault of the Akct of
Steel concluded between Glano and Ribbentrop on May 00*
1939* The German»Italian Alliance* which tranaformed
the loose Ro«**Berlin Azi# into a formal military alliance*
increa#ed Hitler*# and Rlbbentrop*# expectation# of re*»
eolving the Poli#h l##ue without Incurring the intervention
13
of Britain and l&ie weatem power#*
With thi# in mind*
Hitler began to formulate hi# plana for the liquidation
14
0f Poland* He told hi# general# on M#y 25* 1939* that#
12

*a%l Con#niracy & A&Kre##lon. VIII* 445-48*

^^Malcol* Muggeridge* ed* Clano*# Diplomatic Paner#
14
lazi ConapiraoT & Agare##lon. I* 392-400#
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We must attack Poland at the flret suitable
opportiaaity* We cannot expect a repetition of
the Czech affair* There will be a war. Our ta#k
ia to isolate Poland# There miat he no aimultaneou#
conflict with the Western power## fundamentally,
therefore, conflict with Poland « beginning with
the attack on Poland * will only be avicoeaaful
if the Weatem powers keep out of it# If this is
impoaaible it will be better to attack in the
Meat and settle Poland at the same time.
litler went on to state the reasons why he thought Great
Sritain would not intervene#
England*# atake in the war la unimaginably
great# Our enemiea have men who are below average*
No peraonal tiea, no master#, no men of action.
The Engliah did not emerge from the laat war
atrengthened$ R*om a maritime point of view^
nothing waa achieved* Conflict between England
and Ireland, the South African Ilnion became more
independent, oonceaaiona bad to be made to India,
England ia in great danger, her induetrie# are
unhealthy* A Britiah etatéaman can only look
in the future with concern* Therefore the proba
bility i# a till great that the Weat will not
interfere# It may, however, turn ont differently
with gngland and P%»nce, one cannot predict with
certainty# I figure on a trade barrier^ not on
blockade, and with it the aeveranoe of relation##
Riat Ribbentrop ahared thia aame view ia revealed
* conduit de langage be aent to all foreign mlaaion#
In May 1939 in which he atated that the Poliah problem
lould be aettled at anytime by Hitler in forty^ei^t hour#
u&d that the western power# would be unable to render
iffactive aaai#tance to Poland#

It is alleged that Ribben*

trop stated at thii time that if he heard of anyone
«pressing «a opposite view, ha would personally a hoot him
ind assume full responsibility to Hitler for hi#

15
16
action#
General OnderIan* writing in the post»w«r
period and commenting upon events in June 1939# con*
17
eluded*
^ere wee no lack of political warning#. But
Hitler and his foreign minister had pereuaded
themselves that the Western powers would never
risk a war with Germany and that they, therefore,
had a free hand in Eastern Europe*
Throughout the summer of 1959 ^ Hitler was uncompro-»
mislng in his demands on Poland, The British, however,
demonstrated a willingness to reach an understanding# In
18
July, Sir Horace Wilson, presumably at the instruction
of Chamberlain, approached von Dirksen with a broad out
line for a solution to outstanding political, economic,
and military mattew#

At the heart of Wllson*s proposal#

3kmier, op* cit,. 625#
See also* Craig & Gilbert, The Diplomats. 436#
Guderian, Col# Genewl Helna, %)rld War II
Commander of Panzer Troops; Chief of Staff, 1944*45;
helped defeat July 1944 putsch against Hitler; succeeded
by Rrebs#
17
Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader# trans# Constantin#
Fitegibbon, (Mew Torkt 1#*'"!'# ' button ATCo*, 1962), 65#

18
Wilson, Sir Horace, Chief Industrial Adviser
to British Government, 1930*1959, seconded to the
Treasury for service with the Prime Minister, 193519W#
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was the «xargestioïî that Great Britain aisd (Germany oonolud#
ft non-aggiesaiOB pact which would, thereby# free Great
19
Britain from her Polish commitmenta#
ûi early Augnat,
Wilson again put forward the same suggestions, emphasising
the need for Great Britain to undo the Polleh knot a# a
k%ml# for an underatandlng with Germany*
In both inetanee®, Dlrkeen cabled Wilson's proposals
to Berlin but received not the ellghteet reeponee from
20

hie foreign mlnlater#

Thereupon^ amd convinced of the

Importance of Wlleon*» proposal» aa the key to avoiding
What otherwlee appeared an Inevitable conflict* DlAeen
travelled to Berlin In mld#Aug:uet pereonally to preeent
these vlewe to Rlbbentrop and Hitler#
Dlrkaen arrived In Berlin on Auguat 13, 19^, the
day following the diacueeloxw between Rlbbentrop, Hitler
and Clano at Salzburg* Dlikaen flrat, and without eucoeaa,
requeated an Interview with Rlbbentrop* He next conferred
with weltaacker concerning the fate of hla reporte from
London*

Welteacker gave a vague reply inferring that

Etlbbentrop had filed them in the waatebaaket# Dlrkaen did
learn, however, that hie analysis of Great Britain and
the reports of hie discussions with Wilson had been in19
Gordon A* Craig and Pellx Gilbert, Bd*, TW
Diplomate (Princeton# Princeton lAilverelty Pre##, 1955).
00
Herbert von Dlrkeen, Moacow, Tokyo. London (Norman:
Dhlvereity of Oklahoma Frees, Ï§BFJ7 2S¥-g'S.
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:erpP0t@d by Rlbbentrop
further aigma of Brltlah
21
feakneag»** After waiting for severRl day# without
receiving an interview with Ribbentrop, Dlrksam, in dlsgnat;, realgned from the foreign office and wrote Rlbben»
:rop a lengthy memorandum atatlng that Great Britain would
8#
goat certainly go to war If Oeiwany attacked Poland,
Riia dlacuaeion of Rlbbenkrop*» relatione with von
)lTkaen al^nificantly reveal Ribbentrop** prediepoaed
lonvlotion that regardleaa of what happened Great Britain
fould not fight# Ribbentrop either believed thla ao
itron^ly or elae had doubt* of the strength of hi# own conrlotlona #o that he refused to liaten to m&yone with a
contrary opinion^ regardleaa of how good the eouroe* !Riere
la, however» one additional factor which might have in»;'
riuenced Ribbentrop to diaregard Dirkeen*a advice* At thla
point* German'»5oviet negotiation* were prooeedlmg at a
papld pace and it aewied poealble that an alliance could
)e reached with the Soviet TMlon* It ia poaaible* there*
rore$ that Ribbentrop concluded that if thia alliance
:culd be realiged it would force Great Britain into an even
yeaker poaltion and that Germany could therefore well afford
bo tuM» ita back on the Britlah offer#

21
Ibid..
Ibid.. 230.

Th# eonvers&tioïiB between. Hitler, Rlbbentrop, and
Clano, held in mlâ-âuguat, 1939, at Salfburg, provide
additional proof that Hitler and Rlbbentrop flimly be*
lieved that a Oermam^Poliah conflict would mot draw Great
25
Britain Into a war* Clano recorded that#
Hitler repeatedly etated that be is oonvinoed
that the conflict will be localized end gives the
following reasons $ Aranoe and England will cer
tainly make extremely theatrical gesture# but will
net go to war^ beeauae their military and moral
ppeparation* are not euch aa to allow the* to be*
gin
conflict, At the moat the Engllmh cam
get up a blockade in the Horth 8ea between the
eoaata of Scotland and Scandanavia and at
mouth
of the Channel# They might even attempt gome air
action agalnmt Gorman centre#, but that la not
probable^ ei%ier for fear of f^eAaan antl*alrcraft
defoncea or fwir of reprlaala#
Rlbbentrop expreeaed hie conviction in thla regard bg; re#
marking to Clano that "hia information and above all hla
PByctM)loA:lca3^ knowledge of Bngland made him certain that
24

any armed Brltlah intervention 1@ ruled out#**

Clano

disagreed wl^ Bltler and Rlbbentrop but alncerely hoped
that they were correct#

Cleno recalled that on one

occaaion during the#e dlgcuBalon#^ he and Rlbbentrop were
walking In th@ garden and he aaked the German foreign
minleter* *W©11, Rlbbentrop^ what do you wantT 3he Corri
dor or ranzigt

»Fot any mora,* Rlbbentrop replied* *We

w&at War*"
^Muggerldge, eg»* MS*#
24

Ibld.^ 897,

^^Galeaaao Clano, The Clano Diariea {New York* Etoubleday & Company, lac,, 1946), 686,
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Ciano's recolleétions seem to leave little doubt
tiat Hitler and Rlbbentrop were bent on the invasion of
Bland and that both were

convinced that Great

rlt&in would remain paaalve. To wh&t extent Hitler*#
ttltnde was Influenced by Rlbbentrop la difficult to judge,
at that his Influence was more tiian aliwht is Implied In
on HasseH*s Diary when be wrote J

"Ooeriag no longer baa

aeh to say; Hiraaler, Goebbela, and Rlbbentrop are now
26
anaglng Hitler»**
At another point* Von Bmeeell r*o@rd#d
o&t#

**AcGordlng to #11 reporta, Rlbbentrop la the man

bo has the most Influence with Hitler#"

It Is umder-

tandable tb#t Sltley ##s dependent to a oonsldermble degr##
pon Rlbbentropfs advice and judgement, because #ft#f
Ibbentrop had be m entirely oorreot in his predlotloms
r the reactions if the wemtom powers#

And the Aaehrer

id no reason to believe that Rlbbentrop*s "paycholoRloal
aowledge" of Britain was anything but oorreot#
On August 23^ 1030, Rlbbentrop returned from Nosoo#
Baring the Germam-^Sovlet (Areaty of Fon-Aggresslon#

Rils

almlnated a work of several months, beginning roughly
26
Ulrich von Hassell, the Yon Hassell (Doubleday
Company, lac,, 1947), 60*
27
Ibid#. 45,
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rteF Brltmlm*# gusaraat#» to Poland, and was aimed at
iTldlng Russia and the West®m power##

It had h##n

Ibbentrop*# contention throughout that if a Ruaaian
llianc# could be obtained, Great Britain would be left
ithout a potential ally in eaatem gurop# and would thereor# be even more reluctant to involve herself in a general
ar over Poland#

fh« Germam-Seviet Alliance increaaed

itler*# eateem for Ribbentrop and hia diplomacy and com""
inced the fuehrer that Great Britain bad b##n forced into
poaition from which ehe could do nothinti but alt back
nd peaaiv#ly witm### #venta,
Th# importanc* Hitler attached to the Ruaaian
lllance in ruling out poaeible Brltiah intervention la
learly revealed in a conference with hia generala em
28
ugumt #9, 1930* Be atated*
Colonel aeneral von Brauchitach baa promiaed
m# to bring th# war againat Poland to a conclueion
witbln a f#w w»#k## If h# would hav# told me that
it weùld tak# two y#ara or even one year only, I
would not have iaaued the order to march and would
have temporarily entered into an alliance with
England inataad of Russia# p»r w# cannot conduct
a long war# In any eaa# a new altuatlon haa new
been created* I have witneaaed the miaerable worm#
Daladier and Chamberlain in Munich# They will be
too cowardly to attack, fhey will go no further
than blockade. Against it w# hav# our autarchy
and th# RueaIan mw material»# Poland will b# d#populatad and colonlaad with 0#rman#* My pact with
Poland was only meant to atall for time# And besides, gentlemen, in Russia will happen Just what
I hav# practiced in Poland# After Stalin'# death

28
Iftgi Conapiracy & Aggreeaion, VII, 755*54#
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(b# la seriously 111) w® aha11 cruah the Soviet

tJsaloa*
Rpom this point, events moved swiftly#

On August

SS, 1939, Britain anawered the Oermaa-soviet Alllame# by
amnoumclag %at the Anglo^foliah pact had been aigmed
and thereby made effiolal#

It is plain that neither

Hitler nor Ribbontrop had counted on this development#
Rlbbentrop testified at Nuremberg that following the
British announcement he went to Hitler and perauaded the
29

Fuehrer temporarily to halt the Invaalon of Poland*
Cfoerlng testified that Hitler waa alao dlaturbed#

Qoerlng

atated that on the aame day that Britain gave her guarantee
to Poland Hitler called him on the telephone to tell him
that be had a topped the Invaalon acheduled for the following
day, Goerlng aaked for how lemg, and Hitler replied that
it waa jnat temporary but he would flrat have to aee If he
30

oould eliminate Brltlah intervention*
Although Britain*a unreserved announcawent to
support Poland dlaturbed Hitler and hie foreign minlater,
it nevertheleaa did not deatroy their convictiona that
Great Britain would not go to war. General Guderlan,
oonmenting upon these events of August 25*26, substantiated
@1
this when he wroteI
^9à#l Conaplraoy & A^reaaion. VIII, §3S-36«
^(*Ibid.. 634.
31
Quderian, ©£• cit.. 66#
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&t a aeeret mgreememt with the
Ruasiaas during these day* H ltl#r had Imaiimd
th# prAtaction of bla rear Im the ©vest of war
bvt owlmg to Rlbbemtrop*# dlaaatroix# ImflMemee#
lllixalom# were atlll belmg cherlehed oomoermlmg
the pretahle reaotloma of the *eeter* pewera#
It was eoaaldered imlikely that they wowld
declare war*
*eaawhile relatloma betweem Areat Brltal* amd
ermamy contla%ed through Headeraoa im Berlin»

Oa Awg«st

1@@9 mitier* Hemdereom a#d Ribbewtrop met la ooafer*
aoe# B|eader#«a read a letter from Chamberlala la which
he lattLr aekaowledged the meed for a eettlememt aad for
he frlex^hlp ef oermamy aad a%igga#ted that direct
%otlatleaa begim Immediately oa the prlmelplea ef mafeuardimg Poland*# eeaeatlal latereet# amd reeolvlag the
elleh preble# by aa imteraatleaal gwaraatee#

Chamber*

al»*# letter apparemtly left the doer epea for agreemeat
ad paaaed the laltlatlve to Hitler# At thla polat, it
eewed dlffleult f*r Hitler te decide em agreemeat or war#
ei##aoker recorded ,that 51tier mad Rlbbeatrep apeat the
emalader of the day trylag to decide on lAilch couree to
ake* CM mlaute^ accerdla^^ te welmaaoker* they apoke la
he frleadlleat terme about Great Brltala aw5 the mext
la%te they talked of waglag mtr at amy price, b%t as the
ay were oa their thought# turned mere aad more toward#

Britleh 2#r Bl^ B^k (mew York* Phrrar &
laebart

*101".
M
mr,
Plimlly on August 29 Fltler answered Chamberlain*#
letter by telling Rendereon that he etlll deelred an Anglo*
German underatandlng but that the Pollah problem oonatltuted a barrier to agreement# Hitler al#o etated that h#
i&w mo possibilité of resolving the que#tion by negotiation
but was, however, still willing to enter into direct
lieotiaaion##

At the #ame time, Ribbent%*op told Henderaon

that he would immediately draft a set of propoaal# aimed
kt a aolution* He further aaeured the Britiah ambasmador
that if a Poliah repreaentative appeared within twenty»
54
four hour#, he would be well received*
Although the
Chamberlain letter aeemed to have moderated Hitler*# ten*
womewhat, it by jao mean# convinced Hitler and Ribbantrop
bhat Great Britain would honor her Pollah commitment##
3eneral Haider,

in hi# Diary. #tat#d that *a# a reeult

)f the GhamAerlain letter, the impreaaion in Berlin wa#
that Great Britain waa a till aoft on the laaue of a major
far#*
55
Emat von Relmaacker, Memoir# ( Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1951) 208,
^'H&gi Con»piracy & AKgre##ion. VIII, 466*69,
56
Haider, Fran#, German General, Chief of Army
General Staff, Dacember 1958 to October 194B*
56
Rpan# Haider, The Private War Journal of General)berat Fran* Haider. I-TTTr, Tôffice of dKie^T couneeTKr
iâFl^rljîieïT^ïeali^rters, European Command, mimeographed
3©py), 57.
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la the late evening of August 30, 1939, Rlbbentrop
57
kooompenled by the Interpreter Schmidt, met with Header»on to irecelve the Brltleh government*e reply to Hitler*#
%ote of the preceding day, Rlbbentrop*# mood wa# hoetll##
Î® ranted at Bender#on because th# Polish repreeentatlv#
lad not yet appeared*

Eendereon replied that to #xpeot

flthln twenty*four hour# a Polish representative Wbo bad
lot even #een the German propoeal# wa# unreaaonable*
Fbllowlng a heated debate» Rlbbentrop f^rloualy produced
k document and read the German government*# propomal# In
3erman #o rapidly that Eendereon wa# unable to gra#p their
Pull content*

When Rlbbentrop flnlahed* Hendereon a#ked

Por a copy of the propoeal# for tranamlttal to the Brltlah
&md Poll#h government#* Bit much to Hendereon*#, and ev%#
;ch##idt*# #urprl#e Rlbbentrop refumed, aaylng. It wa# new
boo late anyway #lnoe the Polleh repreeentatlve had failed
bo appear* With thl#, the converaatlon# ended In th# meet
38
mpleaeant atmo#pbere*

Sebmldt, Dr* Paul Otto, Interpreter In the
}ermm Foreign Mlnletry, 1925-1645*
38
mk*l Oon#x>lraoT & ^«:gre##lon. VIII, 472-75.
See al#o* K#vll# Hendereon, Failure Of A Mlssloa
[Mew York# G« P* Putnam*# Son#, 1940'J,"'iS3»86*'"
See alsoi Paul Schmidt, HItier*s Int#rpr#t#f*
R#H#C# Steed, ed. (London* w1llïam"'jkeïneauum,
1951), 161-58*
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Both H#iad#r#om mmà aehmidt l*t#r

that th#y

firmly believed that Ribbeatrop bad refueed to give Bemder#em th# pMp###!# b#*#%## to# f##y#d that ar##t Brltal#
#o%ld b# abl# t# p#r#uad# Pelamd to agree t# the 0#rm#m
50
damaad# amd w#uld tkoa mullify emy exow## t# attack Polaad*
R&l# jW&ememt «««sa valid almo# It *a# f#lt at th# tlm#
that th# Germaa d#mamd# were mot, Im thamaelve#,; emtlrely
imreamemabl# amd might well haw# ##rv#d a# a b*#l# f#r
a#gotlatlom#*

But lmat#ad, Rlbb#mtPop oh#8# to eat all

thr#ad# leadlmg to a p#a##fal aolwtlom, thereby falllmg t#
d# hi# part im prevemtlmg a altuatlom which ##uld emly
lead t# war,
ûm Aixgoet 51, 1959, Hltl#y d#flmit#ly decided %p##
ear amd gave

erder fer the attaA #m felamd i# eoimemc#

th# fellewlmg mormlmg*

Qm September 5, 195#^ after twe

day# of the p#ll#h*@ermam flg^tlmg, Areat Brltalm declared
ear om 0###mmy#

Dr# Sahmldt, who tramalated th# Britleh

aete to Hitler, clearly recorded Bltler*# amd Rlbbemtrep*#
40
r##ctl#m# wh#m h# wrote*
Wh#m I #mt#r#d th# room, Hltl#r wa# elttlmg at
him d##k amd R11»b#mtfep #t#od by th# wlmd#w# B#th
looked mp expeetamtly ae I earn# Im* I #topped at
eem# dletamc# frmrn Eltl#r*a d##k, amd «lowly

*^3#hmldt, 22# «It*. 151^69.
4Û
Ibid*. IW.
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trmn#lmt#d the British government*# ultimatum#
When I finished there w&s complete silence#
Hitler sat immobile, gazing before him# He was
not at a lose* am afterward# etated» nor did he
rage a# other# allege# He eat completely ellent
and umeovlng*
After an interval which #e«med an age, h#
turned te Rlbbentrop who had remained # tending by
the window# **Wtmt mowT** a#ked Hitler with a aavage
look, a# though implying that hi# Pbreign Mini#ter
had mlaled him about Bngland*# probable reaotlon*
Rlbbentrop answered quietly) "I aaaime the
French will hand in a similar note within the hour#
Althoug# Rchmldt wa# the only other pereon preeent
rhen Hitler and Rlbbentrop received the Brltleh ultimatum^
^thera ahared the aame view#

Otto Dietrich, Hitler*# pre##
41
ihief, writing In the pe#t*war period* remarked#
Hitler had not expected a&gland and Mmnoe to
enter the war on behalf of Poland# It wa# plain te
#ee bow #tunned he wa# by the declaration of war#
He thou^t the We#tern piowér# were not eufficiently
re*armed and believed the Weat Wall oonatltnted a
political ahield againat them# Tbl# miacalcnlation
on Hitler*# part wn# ultimately rooted in hi#
complete lack of under#tending of moral factor#
in international politic# and hi# excluaive faith
in force# Bnt Rlbbentrop al#o undoubtedly played
a fateful part# It 1# true that Hitler could not
be ewayed once he bad made a deolalon, but without
Rlbbentrop he would not have come to auch perverae
conoluaion# about Eagland# Although unteaohable,
he depended upon hi# foreign mlniater for the fnct#
of life abent foreign countriea and diplwmatic re»
latlona# If Rlbbentrop had advleed agalnat it* he
would acarcely have undertaken the attack on Poland,
with the conaequencea that inevitably flowed out of
it* given the pelltloal altuatlon of the time#

41
Otto Dietrich, Hitler#
k)mpany, 1966), 47^8#

C Chicagoi Henry Begaery
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idmlral Raeâar, in his poet-war testiaonies, placed th#
mjor portion of the blame for the outbreak of the war
43
iquarely on Rlbbentrop when he saidi
Dk my opinion» it warn net given to the Fuehrer
to grasp fully the mentality of the Bmgliahe The
peraon ef Rlbbentrop waa in thla connection #
special obstacle insofar as he made difficult th#
tran#ml#alon te the fuehrer of conception#, based
on decade# of experience, and on historical etudie#
of experienced diplomat# like von Meurath and the
diplomat# of the Kavy, which conception# could have
#e%^ed the P\%ehrer a# the ba#l# of hi# judgemw&t#
and deci#lon#,
the part of the Engllmh, the die-hard Germano
phobe# began to poi#om the ata^aphere# Oa the part
of the Oenwn#, th# appointment of the equally
atupld and conceited and diplomatically unuaabl#
von Rlbb#mtrop a# ambeasador in London, and lat#r
a# succeaeor to Reurath a# foreign minister, made
it lmpo##lble fer every tedlouely prepared agr##ment to develop##
fevlle Renderaon, writing at the end of hi# ml##lon#
;#nerally agreed with Dietrich, Schmidt, and Pmeder and
compared Bi#marok and the

telegram incident t# Rlbben-

;rop and hi# refuaal to aubmit the German propeaal# tke
light of Auguat 50, and concluded that Rlbbentrop felt
le needed a war to prove he wa# a "#econd Biamarck#**
44
lendewon furrier ob#ei*ved that#
It is impoealble to exaggerate the malign iafluence of Rlbbentrop, Goebbela, Eimmler, and company. It wa# conalatently sinister, not #o much
because of its auggeetlveneea {since Hitler alone de»
^^Raeder, Erich, Grand Admiral, Commander in Chief
^f German Navy, 1936-1943#
^^Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression* VIII, 688#
^^enderaon, op, clt,# 263-64#
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elded policy) nor bocauao it merely Applauded
and encouraged, but beoauee Hitler did appear
to healtate a^d the extremlet# of the party at
once proceeded to fabricate aitwatloma calculated
to make Hitler embark upon coureea which even he
at time# aeema to have ahrunk from rlaklmg#
The list is almost endleae of those who generally
Ibared theae opimiona of Rlbbentrop and the effect of
lis advice upon Hitler#

Included would be such pereonalltlea

la weiaaaoker# Keaaelrlmg, von Haaaell, von Mackenaen*
ind Ciano, to only mention a few. Some of theae m*en kept
lay-to-^day dlarlee^ other# reaerved their comment# for tb#
;io#t*^war p#riod^ and all had different reaeon# for writing*
^ome wrote for pergonal vindication, other# to apologia#
Tor Germany# But the fact rmnaina that all of theae men,
#any of #iom were oleae to Eltler, Blbbentrop, and event#
>f Uie time, e#eentlally agreed in their eatlmatlona of
^Ibbentrop and hi# influence upon Hitler*

therefore It

xeema reaaonable to conclude that Ribbentrop, frwa the
»nd of hi# London ambaaeadorahlp to the attack on Poland,
ionsletently edvlaed Hitler that Britain and the weatera
power# were weak and unwilling to fight and thl# advice
»z#rted an important, even major Influence upon Hitler
md hi# decision»»

CHAPTER VI
CORCimiC*
Esaeiitially thl# has beem a study of attitudes aad
InfluencesÎ

or to be more precis®, the attitude# of

roacblm von Rlbbentrop and hie l&fluenc# upon the pollole#
u&d decielon# of Adolph Hitler* By It# mature* a etudy
>f tble kind la both complex and laconoluelv#, oae about
lAiloh the flaal word can probably aever be writ tea*

But

Mo&uee of It# oomgplexlty aad Inconoluelveme## It doe# mot
thereby defy Imterpretaitlon or preclude one from drawing
iertalm ooaclualome.
Rlbbentrop*# meteoric rlee from a wine merchant to
bhe Mlmlater of Pareign Affair* of the Third Reloh within
khe apace of aljc year# ]?epre#emt# a phenomenon In the
realm of diplomacy, phenomenal becauee of hla lack of
diplomatic preparation, ^Rxy Hitler choae Rlbbentrop when
3@ could have selected from among the many capable and
experienced member® of the German foreign office can only
)e anewered in term# of Rlbbentrop'# character and Hitler*#
lletruat of German officialdom,
Ih Rlbbentrop, Hitler found many appealing quailtie##
ie wa# something of a yes—mn who. If he did not share
-107-
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lltler'a view#, at least seldom dle&greed with hi# Fuehrer*
Ee always made it a policy to tell Hitler what he wanted
vo hear and in thia manner warn able to burrow his way into
litler'a oonfidenoe#

Rlbbwtrop moreover poaaeaaed qwallt*

ea whioh aat him apart from the uaual type of Hitler*#
lubordinatea, He was wealthy, poliahed, widely travelled,
tad fluent in three languagea*

In addition, and probably

*o#t important of all Ribbentrop waa o]^nly pro"»Brltiah
Fith many important and influential Britiah oontaota#
The claim that Rlbbentrop waa a fanatical devote#
if the teneta of Ma%l ideology la queatlonable#

What

evidence there la tend* to ahow him aa a political oppor:unlat#

Whether Hitler waa of thia opinion la ala#

lueatlonable, but at leaat he found in Hibbentrop the type
if man with whom he bad more in common than with the
career diplomate of the Wllhelmatraaae* Ikeae latter were
"ar too conaervative, ao the Fuehrer felt, to be enthual"
latlo about idie dynamioa of the Rational Soclallat Revo*
-utlon. Imatead, Hitler preferred more eager, more emotion*
il iMn who would not ahrink from violence In executing
:he dictatea of the Nazi doctrine.

®x©so he considered

lore important prerequlaitlea than political intelligence
ind formal preparation#

And Rlbbentrop had all of these

Luallflcatlona in abundance.

'109Mladful therefore of his British aemtlmeats mad
îontftcts. Hitler sont Rib «ntrop to London im 1936 with
She hope that be would be able to obtain the long*#ought
Inglo-German alliance^

But Ribbentrop went to London an

Inglophile end oame away an Anglophobe, Im the couree of
lis ambassadorship, hie optimisa turned to peeaimiem, his
Priendllneee te bittermeee#
lieappointment#

It warn a bittemeee bora of

It wae In thle frame of mind that Rlbben*

Krop formed hie dletorted and dleaetrou# oplniona of th*
)rltl«h people*

Be eame away from London oonvinoed Wiat

Iritain wa# weak, that her «nplre wae deoaying* and that
ler people we%*e wnwilllng to fight another war* In holding
bheee view# in 1937 and 1938, Ribbentrop wa# not alone, for
Ln theae year# there waa a decided, popular, and wlde#pread
ivereion to war in both Britain and Mranoe#

Rlbbentrop*#

ai#judgement lay In hi# a##i#q»tion that there wa# no limit
Ke what the people of Britain and Rranoe would endure from
f«Ei œimany before they reeorted to war#
Theee were unfortunate view# for one who headed the
German foreign office and eteered C&erman foreign policy
through the treaoherou# waters of the next two year#*
garly in 1958, Hitler took a dim view of Ribbentrop*#
malyai» of Britain, considering it a product of hi# ex
aggerated Anglophobia#

But am time passed. Hitler oame

aore and more to share Ribbentrop*# calamitou# assumptions*
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lh« policies and actl©a« of the #e»tem power# certainly
seeawd to substantiate Blbbentrop*a contentions, for
mparnce amd Britain even before bad atood paaaively by
fhile Hitler reoccupied the PQiinelamd#

When German troop#

aarobed into lu#tria, again there were protests but ne
concerted action, and when the west capitulated to Hitler
it Munich (the hi^ point of hi# hold over Europe), Hitler
Ml# convinced of the eeirectne## of Ribbentrop*# advice*
®ie que#tion caa be asked whether Hitler, by him#elf end without tdie help of Ribbentrop, would have arrived
kt the#e #ame oonclueion#*

To #ay that he would i# aelling

tibbentrop*# influence a little short#

Bad net Rlbbentrop

)#en Hitler'# right hand man, it la very po##ible that
Chi# poeition would have fellen to (>oering, and it i# well
mown that (loering wa# much le#a warlike in hi# viewe and
favored, inetead ef war, a #econd Munich*

Oa the other

aand^ Hitler had much evidence to #ub#tantlate hi# oon*
miction#, yet, at time# he appeared te heaitate and doubt
bhe strength of the## conviction##

When this ocoured,

idbbentrop wa# at hi# #ide to #ugge#t and encourage#

Thi#

sees# to be the key factor in Rlbbentrop*a influence with
hitler and partially, at least, answer# the que#tion of
Aiether Hitler would have come to these perver## conclu#ion#
without the Assistance of him foreign mini#ter*
But in the period following Munich a gradual change
ms evident in British policy#

The Munich settlement was
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ïot exactly popular* but at least It was generally felt
La Britain that everything reaaoaable had been done to
latlate Hitler*# territorial ambitlorn# In Europe, and
klme had been

Bwt there #a# aleo an increaae In

military preparation# amd people began to face the thought
)f war with more reality#

On the other hand, Rlbbentrop*#

rlew# regarding the west were eeeentlally unchanged#

He

knd Hitler approached the C%ech oriel# wl^ confidence
khat nothing wa# to be feared from either Prance or Britain#
Ehelr confidence eeemed juetlfled*

Pbr In March 1999 when

31tler marched Into Prague# the weetem power# atood
paealvely by*

The time for a ahowdown had not yet arrived,

)ut In Britain It *a# realized that the Munich agreement
fa# jTxet another *#crap of paper'* and Hitler ambition#
and not been aatlefled through appea#ement#
With euoh remarimble #ucoe##e# behind them. It wm#
aardly aetonlahlnj^ that Hitler and Rlbbentrop turned to
bhe Polish problem with aaaurence that their way wa# un»b#trueted. Bad not the Rhineland, Austria, Spain, Munich,
knd Prague demon#trated that Britain and A»nce did not
Intend to Interfere?

Rlbbentrop wa# oonvlmced that there

ra# little danger In another throw of the dice, and he
kdvl^ed and encouraged Hitler to aettle the queetlon of
3anzlg without fear of British intervention# He wa#
apparently totally unaware of what Prague meant to the
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îritlsh#

Not aa fully convinced of Brltlah decay as

tlbbentrop. Hitler entertained «one doubta* eepeolally
ifter Britain gave her "blank check" to Poland in April
L939*

But Rlbbentrop kept up hi# conalatent advice, and

fhen he brought horn® the Gemian*8ovlet fact Im Auguet
1939, Hitler*# fear# were allayed, Sven after Britain
md© her quarante® t© Poland official and Hitler again
(bowed sign# of healtatlng, Rlbbentrop wa# at hi# #lde to
idviae and encourage. And when finally confident that his
"orelgn mlnleter wae correct. Hitler decided to tgJce the
(top that plunged the world into the abyee of World War II,
Da all the catalogue of crime# and ml#take# made by
tlbbentrop and Hitler, the really declelve error lay In
daelr failure to perceive Britain'# change of policy after
hinlch and more pronouncedly after their rape of Prague,
feither Hitler nor Rlbbentrop wa# obllvlou# of the surface
reflection# of Britain*# policy, the Antl«Aggre##lon Front
md guarantee to Poland were there for all to see* Rather
;be mistake was in the interpretation Hitler and Rlbbma*
;rop gave to these external sign# of Britain*# change of
leart, Pbr them it wa# mare bluff, a feeble attempt to
ntimldate Germany, In the Anglo*Poll#h Pact they failed
;o #ee either any evidence of Brltlah political molality
•r the extent to which Britain had indebted her national
lonor. They failed to realize that this time Britain

«•US"*

could not back dowa#

Rlbbentrop showed hlmwelf as aoot®-

thing considerable leas than the "eecond Bismarck"
Hitler saw la him#

Tn hla Ignorance, folly, caprlclouaneea,

and dlplonmtlo Ineptneaa, he reaembed a eeooad Berchtold*
The central que#tIon In thle eordld drama *111
always be the extent of Hibbeatrop^s Influence on Hitler#
To some, Retirath for Inetanoe, Rlbbentrop was a mere yesman. Hitler's meeRen^^r boy. To others, swch aa Ooerlng,
Rlbbentrop*a Influence waa more algnlfloant, and Ooerlng
frequently referred to **Rlbbentrop*3 war#"

In reality,

however, the extent of hie Influence aeeme to lie aomewhere
between theae two extreme*#

Rlbbentivp waa not wholly a

yee^man, for he had atrong opinions of hla own and exerted
conalderable effort to convince Hitler of the loglo of hla
oonvlctlona#

On the other hand, he had no real power to

oxake policy declalona, and he realleed that the permanence
of hla poaltlon Mated aolely on hla ability to pleaae the
Fuehrer# 3ut Rlbbentrop took advantage of hla poaltlon
to advlae and encourage Whenever Hitler faltered#

Di

this manner, Rlbbentrop waa an Important, and aometlmea
even a major. Influence upon Hitler and hla declalona
from 1934 to 1959.
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